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Executive Summary
Latin American and Caribbean nations are giving greater attention to the kinds of labor
market programs and policies that might best support the region's transition and integration
into a more global marketplace.   The labor force of the future will need to be both more
highly skilled and more flexible to changing employment.  Would unemployment insurance
(UI), which provides workers with transitional income until they find new work, be an
appropriate and useful instrument in Latin America and the Caribbean?   The region and the
developing world as a whole have had very limited experience with UI; it has largely been
conceived of as an industrial country program.
This study examines unemployment insurance (UI) for its potential application and
implications for Latin American and Caribbean economies.  It surveys current experience
with unemployment insurance programs through case studies and draws lessons learned in
particular for the Latin American and Caribbean region.  Seven case studies are examined:
three within the region (Argentina, Barbados, and Brazil) and four outside (Japan, Germany,
Poland, and the United States).  The study also examines a specific sub-issue regarding the
financing of training through unemployment insurance revenues.
From a distance, unemployment insurance appears to be a similar instrument in every
country.  It provides income support in the form of weekly or monthly payments to recently
laid-off workers to enable them to seek new employment.  Yet from this common structure,
UI programs can vary substantially in the eligibility of workers, the level and length of
benefits, and the type of administration.  Most important, while UI may have a similar form
across countries, the national objectives sought by instituting the program can be quite
different.  The issue of the specific objective of a UI program is particularly relevant to
whether it makes sense for a Latin American or Caribbean economy.
Overall, the study concludes that unemployment insurance is not a priori broadly applicable
to the region.  Rather, a decision for each individual country within the region should be
made based on national labor market needs and conditions and the desired national objective
of unemployment insurance.   There are likely, the study concludes, countries in the region
where unemployment insurance would be appropriate but great attention is required to the
details of design, objectives, and execution.  The most likely profile of a country where UI
should be considered is one undergoing substantial volatility of formal sector employment,
where the informal sector is not large, and where administrative capabilities are sufficient to
carry out the program.  It can also be useful to countries with high rates of seasonal
unemployment such as Caribbean economies.
 A. Clarity of Objectives of UI Critical for Latin America and the Caribbean
The study reviews four principal objectives sought in current unemployment insurance
systems: 1) income replacement/reward labor force attachment; 2) social safety net; 3)
macroeconomic stabilization; and, 4) labor market restructuring and transition.- 2 -
Given regional concerns regarding high levels of poverty and income inequality, one might
assume that the social safety net goal would be the most appropriate and applicable one to the
region. The study concludes instead that unemployment insurance is most applicable to the
region as a labor market transition tool for the formal sector and least applicable as either a
wide social safety net or tool for macroeconomic stabilization.  Using information from the
case studies, the study demonstrates that unemployment insurance typically does not serve
the poor, but rather middle-income workers.  The low participation of the poor in
unemployment insurance would be further accentuated in many countries in the region with
large informal sectors.   The study stresses the importance for the region of clarifying specific
national objectives sought for UI within a national labor market system, rather than seeing UI
as a short-term response to an economic crisis as has been the case in a number of countries.
 B. Key Regional Factors for Considering UI Systems
The report identifies a number of key regional characteristics that are important to deciding
whether and what kind of unemployment insurance system might best fit a country in the
region.  These regional characteristics exist in varying degrees among countries in the region.
In a number of cases, the study recommends design features that can compensate for these
factors.
The first factor to be considered is the presence of a large informal sector.  The report
emphasizes that little study has been conducted about the interaction of UI in dual labor
markets (informal/formal).  The preliminary evidence gathered from Latin American and
Eastern European cases is that the presence of a large informal sector may undermine the
utility of UI, by making it impossible to insure that recipients are looking for new work, and
may provide perverse incentives to increase further the informal sector.  The presence of a
large informal sector greatly weakens the ability of UI to serve either as a social safety net or
a macroeconomic stabilization tool.
A second factor to be considered in designing a UI system in the region is the level of payroll
and other labor taxes.  In some cases in the region, UI would need to be part of an overall
restructuring and labor market reform to insure that additional UI taxes did not unduly
disadvantage labor and discourage business investment.  A third factor to be considered is the
extent of severance pay or other termination benefits already in place and how they would
potentially interact with UI.  In many OECD countries where the first UI programs were
created, there were fewer nationally-mandated termination benefits.  The study recommends
that countries in the region with nationally-mandated benefits review these benefits
simultaneously with consideration of UI, so that one benefit does not contradict, dwarf, or
undermine the other as is seen in some of the case studies.
The fourth factor identified in the study of particular importance to the Latin American and
Caribbean region is whether and how to cover unemployed youth.  Youth unemployment
rates are typically high in the region, and depending on how UI eligibility is set, the bulk of
the UI program could, inadvertently, end up serving a youth population.  Experts are
concerned that income benefits from UI, delivered without training or other employment- 3 -
assistance, can have corrosive effects on the young who have not yet established initial work
skills and habits.  In Latin American and Caribbean countries with high youth
unemployment, the study recommends particular attention to the eligibility criteria of UI and
the use of youth- oriented employment programs rather than UI to address the problem of
youth unemployment.
 C. UI and the Financing of Training
A large number of the existing UI systems permit recipients to obtain training/retraining
while receiving unemployment insurance benefits.  It is far rarer that unemployment
insurance revenues are specifically used to finance training programs; typically
unemployment insurance and training have distinct revenue sources.  Unemployment
insurance payouts are usually so large and cyclical that there is little surplus to fund other
types of programs.
While no system finances training through UI revenues, the study identifies two existing
types of models that relate the financing of training with UI.  One is the "large pool" model in
which UI payroll taxes are pooled with other sources (including government tax revenues)
into one fund which finances UI, training, and other initiatives.  Germany and to a lesser
extent Argentina fit this model.  The second is the "small pool" or "developmental uses of UI"
model in which a small portion of UI revenues is used to fund limited training or employment
creation initiatives.  Japan fits this model.
While there are some interesting features to the small pool model, in neither the large nor
small pool cases do UI funds finance the bulk of a nation's training system. Quite simply, the
demands on UI revenues are too substantial and increase countercyclically during economic
downturns just when you would want to spend more on training. This makes UI an unreliable
source for financing training. UI revenues to fund a nation's principal training programs
would be both fiscally and programmatically unsound.- 4 -
  I.  Unemployment Insurance: An Overview and Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides short-term financial support to workers who are
laid off from their jobs, typically through no fault of their own.  It has become a common
program in the advanced industrialized countries, but to date relatively rare in the
developing world.  Reflecting this trend, unemployment insurance is rare in Latin America
and the Caribbean.  Currently, seven countries in the region have some form of
unemployment insurance
1 and even within this group a number of programs are extremely
limited or under revision.
As many countries in the region are beginning to examine potential areas for labor market
changes and reform, one question is whether unemployment insurance is an appropriate
and useful instrument in the Latin American and Caribbean context.  Many Eastern
European countries, for example, have adopted unemployment insurance systems within
the last 5-10 years to cushion the shock of major job layoffs and market reforms.  But is
unemployment insurance suitable for Latin American and Caribbean labor markets?  What
sorts of roles does UI play in other economies and are those priorities in the region?  What
lessons are learned from past experience that may be relevant to Latin America and the
Caribbean?
This study explores seven diverse cases of unemployment insurance around the world:
three within the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Barbados) and four outside (Germany,
Japan, Poland, and the United States).  In each case, it strives to understand the origins of
the program, its key attributes (eligibility, benefits, requirements), and how it operates.
The intention of surveying a diversity of experience is to draw potential lessons for Latin
American and Caribbean countries in considering whether UI, or what form of UI, might
be appropriate within the particular regional/national policy context.
The study also reviews a related question relevant to UI prospects in the region.
Specifically it examines the financial relationship between unemployment insurance
revenues and labor market training initiatives.  Are UI revenues a vehicle for funding other
labor market programs?  Chapter 3 discusses international experience with UI and the
financing of training and related labor market programs.
This first chapter provides an overview and introduction to unemployment insurance systems
as a foundation for more detailed examination of country cases in Chapter II.  It surveys the
incidence and occurrence of UI worldwide, its principal purposes, and types of programs and
benefits.  The final chapter provides recommendations and lessons learned for Latin
American and Caribbean countries.
                                                       
1 The IDB report identifies: Argentina, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  It also cites
Mexico; however, the Mexican program is only for pre-retirees from ages 60-65.  Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America: 1996 (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1996).- 5 -
 A.  Unemployment Insurance: Purposes and Objectives
Unemployment insurance provides cash benefits to workers who have had some work history
and have become recently unemployed.  It is intended to replace lost income and provide a
cushion until workers can find new employment; once a new job is secured, benefits are to be
terminated.  While having a similar basic function across countries, there are actually
different objectives that may motivate and determine the kind of unemployment insurance
program a country pursues.  Unemployment insurance systems have typically tended to meet
some, or many of the following objectives for a country:
•  Income replacement/reward labor force attachment: A very common aim
for unemployment insurance is to cushion workers in the short-term transition
to new employment.  The intention is to reward not every unemployed worker,
but only those who have typically paid into the unemployment scheme and
demonstrated significant labor force attachment and investment by time spent in
employment.  An important motivation in OECD countries is that UI would
enable workers to hold out for higher paying work more suited to their skill
level.
•  Social safety net: Many programs also contain the objective of preventing a
segment of the workforce from slipping into poverty due to unemployment.
This objective has great variability among programs, as, depending on the
country, only a segment of eligible unemployed workers would likely be near
the poverty line.  Programs that emphasize a social safety net objective typically
provide a low-level of benefits, rather than seek to replace a high percentage of
previous income.
•  Macroeconomic stabilization: UI can be intended to serve a broader function
of stabilizing the economy during downturns or depression, providing the
means to maintain consumer spending and improve welfare.  This
macroeconomic impact has been difficult to measure to date.  But in principle,
to meet this objective, a UI system would need to be comprehensive, seek to
cover a large percentage of the unemployed workforce, and have enough
reserves to finance payments in economic downturns.  Some of the earliest UI
systems such as that of the United States grew out of the experience of the
1930s depression and sought to cushion downward cyclical trends.
•  Promote restructuring/efficiency: In countries undergoing large layoffs and
adjustments to market changes, unemployment insurance can be seen as a way
to reduce workers’ resistance to such changes and facilitate the transition.  This
was an important motivation behind the enactment of UI systems in Eastern
Europe.- 6 -
It is important to keep these differences in objectives in mind in reviewing the variations in
country programs in place today as the objectives sought influence greatly the actual
program design.
 B. Differentiation between UI and Other Job Termination Assistance
This study deals specifically and exclusively with unemployment insurance, but,
depending on the nature of the layoff, there may be other cash benefits that a worker may
receive upon job termination.  This is particularly true in Latin American and Caribbean
countries that have enacted national requirements for the payment of severance payments
and/or compensation for unjust dismissal.
2  It is important to understand what
compensation is available and its purpose in each country before deciding on the
appropriate policy mix.  In principle, severance payments and compensation for unjust
dismissal have different objectives than unemployment insurance, but in practice they
seem to act similarly in that they all provide cash benefits to workers when laid off from
employment.
Compensation for unjust dismissal is intended to discourage employers from firing
workers arbitrarily, such as for organizing a trade union.  It is intended to serve as a
penalty to employers as well as compensation to workers who have unfairly lost
employment.  In some countries, economic and market factors may not be considered
grounds for unjust dismissal and thus eligibility for benefits can be fairly broad.
Severance payments are more specific and usually not as broadly legislated on a national
basis.  Severance payments seek to reward a worker’s long-term investment and
commitment to a firm and vary with the amount of years a worker has been employed.
They typically vary with number of years on the job -- the longer the longevity, the greater
the payment for investment in the firm.  Severance payments are typically made in one
lump sum, while unemployment insurance is received periodically (weekly/biweekly) as it
mirrors a worker's former paycheck and continues only until a worker finds a new job.
While distinct in objectives served, job termination payments and unemployment
insurance occur together in practice.  Because they are funds received upon firing,
severance payments do help cushion a worker's loss of income in the immediate period
following unemployment even if that is not their primary purpose.
Countries vary as to whether they have all, some, or none of any other type of termination
compensation.  In countries like the United States, unemployment insurance is the more
widely received benefit, and only through collective bargaining agreements may workers also
be eligible for severance or unjust dismissal pay.  Conversely, most countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean have requirements for payments due to unjustified dismissal and
a more limited number have severance payments, some quite generous.  In some Latin
American countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil), severance payments may far exceed what a
worker might receive in unemployment insurance.  Thus, while not the subject of this study,
it is important to understand the availability of other job termination benefits and their policy
                                                       
2In some countries, largely OECD countries, these may be provided through collective bargaining agreements.- 7 -
role, to frame and understand the most appropriate policy mix for any one country.  This
study discusses severance pay/job termination benefits in select case studies as relevant.  It
then incorporates lessons from these cases in the concluding chapter.
 C.  UI: International Trends
This data confirms the general perception that unemployment insurance is a common
feature of the industrialized nations of the OECD.  These countries have the majority and
longest standing programs in the world, with the first programs developed in Great Britain,
Germany, and the United States at the turn of the century.
Since the end of WWII, there has been a growth of unemployment programs, spreading
more to the higher income developing countries.  There were only 21 such programs in
1940, but 34 in 1967, 40 in 1987, and 68 in 1997.
3 Figure 1 summarizes the geographic
distribution of UI programs by region.  The largest recent growth of UI programs has been
in Eastern Europe and among the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Figure 1
confirms that, outside of Eastern Europe and the FSU, (23 programs), that UI programs are
extremely rare in the developing world with only six programs in Africa and the Middle
East, three in Asia and, seven programs in Latin America and the Caribbean.
There are many reasons why unemployment insurance has been less prevalent in the
developing world.  Even though these systems are principally self-financed by contributions
of employers and workers, UI programs particularly can be among the most costly of labor
market programs and target a population, that in a developing country context, is not the
neediest.  Proportionately the very poor have less stable job histories, are in informal
(unprotected) employment, and thus are often ineligible for UI.  While a segment of UI
recipients may be poor, in most OECD countries, UI recipients are at the median income
level.  In most OECD countries, there are both social welfare/assistance programs for the
poor and unemployment benefits, and UI is perceived to address a different and distinct set of
economic needs, not those of the poorest.  UI systems require as well an extensive
administrative apparatus both to collect contributions and distribute benefits and much of this
depends on extensive and well-working government services.
                                                       
3Zafiris Tzannatos and Suzanne Roddis, Unemployment Benefits: Draft 1 (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
Social Protection Unit, May 5, 1998), 3.- 8 -
 D.  Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment in Latin America and the
Caribbean
The need to look beyond the region for experience and lessons on unemployment
insurance is important because the more extensive and longer-term experience is outside
the region.  Nearly all of the seven programs in the region currently were designed in the
1980s or 1990s, a number resulting as a response to an economic crisis.  A few of these
programs were too small (e.g., Chile) or too unlike traditional unemployment insurance
(e.g., Ecuador which makes a single payment) to be appropriate for drawing broader
lessons.   Other systems, like those of Venezuela and Chile, are being reconsidered
nationally.  Latin America/Caribbean experience is highly concentrated as well: Barbados
has the only UI program in the Caribbean; there are no programs in Central America; and,
the few existing programs are predominantly in the Southern Cone.  Rarely has
unemployment insurance in the region been a large program on the scale of an OECD-type
system.  Brazil, with the largest program in the region, would be an exception to this,
largely by the sheer size of its workforce.
As unemployment has become a greater concern within the region, and considered a more
permanent feature of market-led economies, there has been interest in considering
alternative approaches to protecting workers from unemployment.  In Chile, there is much
discussion around a proposal to create individual savings accounts for use during
unemployment.  The region has some experience in the individual account approach in the
Brazilian FGTS (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço) as well as in a smaller UI
program in Argentina for the construction sector.  In Argentina, to protect against the high
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Source: Annex 1, U.S. Social Security Administration, 1997.- 9 -
worker, which the worker receives on termination.  These systems have the advantage of
greater transparency (workers can invest in or see contributions placed in their name) and
greater predictability in availability of funds.
The IDB supported the design of a comprehensive reform of the Venezuelan social
security system that included a proposed reform of the unemployment insurance system.
The UI system as designed under the IDB loan provided two accounts: one of individual
accounts for each worker and the other a common solidarity fund from which recently
unemployed workers, without much accumulated in their individual accounts, can
"borrow" on their future account.  Its design features draw on current discussions within
Chile regarding individual account models.  The Venezuelan reform would require a
greater commitment of resources from both employers and workers (4% combined of
payroll/wages).  The redesigned system is pending with the current Venezuelan Congress
and new government.  These trends in the region suggest an important moment in time to
evaluate international experience for its lessons and applicability to the Latin American
context.
The region's dramatic opening to international competition and deregulation of domestic
markets has raised the specter that workers more and more will be exposed to higher rates
of unemployment and labor instability.  Public sector employment is falling throughout the
region and this has been traditionally an area of great employment stability.  Official
unemployment rates, in fact, have not dropped in the region which might have been
expected given higher economic growth rates and a slowing down of the increase in the
labor supply from the latter half of the 1980s.  The average rate of official unemployment
(formal sector) has fluctuated around 10%.  However, this does not account for the greater
perceived problems of unstable informal sector employment (in some Latin nations up to
50% of the workforce) and under or sub-employment.
While poverty, income inequality, and low wages have been persistent concerns within the
region, unemployment is now rising to become one of the region's top concerns.  In recent
surveys, seven out of ten Latin Americans are concerned or very concerned they will lose
their jobs or become unemployed within the next year; 19 out of every 100 think Latin
America's biggest problem is unemployment, exceeding those of low wages, poverty and
inflation.  Latin American employers, in contrast, see greater problems with the quality of
labor supply (e.g., the level of education and training), than unemployment.
4   Concern
about unemployment is greater in the region where there is a higher level of informal
sector employment and greater employment in more volatile non-tradable goods (e.g.,
construction and services).
                                                       
4As quoted in Eduardo Lora and Gustavo Márquez, "The Employment Problems in Latin America: Perceptions
and Stylized Facts?” in  Employment in Latin America: What is the Problem and How to Address It?
(Washington, DC: Proceedings of seminar at the Inter-American Development Bank, May 14, 1998), 3.- 10 -
 E.  UI Programs: Financing, Types, and Design Features
Whether in an industrialized or developing country, unemployment insurance exhibits
variation along a range of similar, key attributes.  There is substantial variability in terms
of who benefits and how generously, how programs are financed, and what function
unemployment insurance serves in the countries' labor market and macroeconomic policy
mix.  Variability continues further in how unemployment insurance -- a so-called passive
labor market policy -- is integrated or linked to active policies such as job training, job
search assistance, and wage subsidies which seek to directly connect workers to new jobs
or upgrade their skills.
Below is a brief review of some key attributes of UI programs as a foundation for examining
the specific country case studies in Chapter II.
1.  Financing
Broadly, unemployment insurance is run by pooling funds that are then paid out
periodically to beneficiaries as they become unemployed.  There are three principal ways
that funds are financed: employer/employee contributions (or just employer contributions);
government financing from general revenues; or, a mixed system of part contributions,
part government revenues.  Funds are either "forward financed" -- that is funds are
accumulated in good years to pay for years when unemployment is high -- or "pay-as-you-
go" in which funds are accumulated to pay for current demands.  Under a pay-as-you-go
system, contributions may need to be increased or benefits curtailed in times of high
unemployment in order not to go into deficit.  This countercyclical effect must be taken
into consideration in designing the most appropriate system for a country, particularly if
macroeconomic stabilization is an objective sought through UI.   Annex I summarizes the
financing type for each UI system worldwide, with the larger number of systems paid
through employer and employee contributions.
The insurance feature of UI comes via its self-financing mechanism. In the majority of
countries, employers and workers contribute, or pay premiums into, a system which only
the unemployed worker draws on should they lose their job.  Like auto insurance, not
every contributor draws benefits, only a percentage who incur misfortune.  There are a
minority of systems which are financed through general government revenues, but they
retain at least the insurance feature that only the unemployed under specified conditions
receive benefits.  Nonetheless, it is more appropriate to call government-financed
programs "unemployment benefit" rather than insurance programs as the self-insurance
feature is removed.
In mixed systems, government revenues play very different roles.  In some, government
revenues are used periodically only when the insurance program runs into deficit or
additional benefits are to be provided (e.g., United States for extended benefits).  In others,
government revenues finance a particular component of the UI program (e.g., Japan). In a- 11 -
number of cases, government financing can be up to two-thirds of program costs.  Most cases
of unemployment insurance are compulsory -- companies and workers are legally required to
pay into the program.  There are a number of cases of non-compulsory systems where UI is
organized on an industry/union basis; this is more typical for Nordic countries.
2.   Types of Unemployment Benefits
Unemployment benefits can typically be apportioned in three generic ways, by:
a)  Earnings-related benefits.  Benefit levels are tied to some percentage of the
recipient's previous earnings; thus, higher income individuals earn higher UI
benefits to compensate for lost income.  Typically a system might set a minimum
and maximum level of benefits using this method.  Country examples: United
States, most European/OECD systems.
b)  Flat-rate benefits.  Benefit levels are set at one low level and do not vary with a
recipient's previous income.  There may be some variation for family size or other
trait.  Country examples: Poland, generally developing country systems.
c)  Income-tested benefits.  Benefits depend on current individual, and (more
likely) family income.  This means, for example, that spousal and investment
income are taken into account for eligibility.  This type of means test is more
typical for welfare-social assistance programs, in Germany, for example,
unemployment assistance using income-tested benefits as distinct from German
unemployment insurance that uses the earnings-related model.  Means testing
requires more complicated administration and oversight.
The Latin American and Caribbean cases profiled in this study typically use
earningsrelated benefits, but in some cases constrain the maximum rate available, so that
the effect is closer to a flat rate benefit (e.g., see case study for Argentina).
3.  Amount and Length of Benefits
The amount that UI replaces a worker's former income, the replacement rate, varies
markedly even among the OECD countries.  Its variability is due to differences in the
percent of income initially covered, how income is calculated, whether such benefits are
taxed, and what ceilings or other restrictions may be in place.
Unemployment insurance varies markedly as well as to how long workers are covered in
their transitional job search.  Workers can be covered as short as 3-5 months in Brazil to
indefinite periods in some Western European countries such as Belgium.  Some European
countries set defined periods for receiving unemployment insurance, but have longer, or
even indefinite periods, for unemployment assistance that functions more like welfare
payments (e.g., Germany).- 12 -
Gross unemployment benefits typically range from 40-75% of average earnings, though
most are capped at the higher income levels.  More important for international comparison
are the actual net replacement rates, taking into account different country level benefits,
restrictions, and weights for length of benefits.  The OECD has struggled to develop
increasingly more accurate measures of gross replacement rates.  Recent data shows a
remarkable range in gross replacement rates among OECD nations.  These rates range
from the high end of 81% (Denmark)/69%(Netherlands) to the low end of 20% for the
United States
5 and Italy.
6  The low end of replacement rates call into question whether UI
truly represents an instrument for maintenance of workers' current living standards.
4.  Dilemmas of Work Incentives
One key question continually raised with unemployment insurance is the danger that too
generous benefits may discourage workers from returning to work, or at least to wait out
the period of benefits before doing so.  This is often termed "moral hazard."  Some portion
of this disincentive to return to work is typically controlled through benefits levels,
duration of benefits, and work search requirements.  Research on the adverse effects on
work incentives has found a very small positive relationship, but it is not typically
considered to be very significant and seems more dependent on overall macroeconomic
conditions than on the UI program itself.
7  The effect on work patterns has been found to
be more troublesome for new entrants, who in some European systems are eligible for UI
with little work history.
8
5.  Administration
Efficient administration is extremely important in meeting most of the key objectives of
unemployment insurance.  Without an efficient administrative structure to provide workers
timely and appropriate payments, objectives for immediate income replacement and
reduction of poverty rates, or macroeconomic stabilization cannot be met.
While UI may be more commonly paid for by taxes on employers and workers, it is
typically administered by government, not private agencies.  There is the case of union
administration of UI in Sweden, and some countries have sector or employer-managed
systems but these are less common.  Administration typically requires the provision of
weekly to monthly benefits in a network of offices throughout the country.  Some offices
are strictly used for unemployment insurance payments; many combine UI within another
government agency or Labor Ministry office.
With this brief overview in mind, the following chapters look in more detail at each of
seven different unemployment systems worldwide.  It examines the policy context for the
                                                       
5This is a U.S. average; replacement rates vary markedly among U.S. states.
6John Martin, "Measures of Replacement Rates for the Purpose of International Comparisons: A Note," OECD
Economic Studies No. 26, 1996/I, 107.
7Tzannatos and Roddis, Unemployment Benefits.
8Joan Wills, telephone interview.- 13 -
origins of each program as well as the benefit levels and coverage of the program, and
highlights key features of program operation.
  II.  Case Studies Of Unemployment Insurance Programs
This chapter surveys a diverse range of national unemployment insurance (UI) programs
to better understand how such programs operate in their national contexts and how they
serve the target populations.  These different national experiences will be drawn on to
identify potential lessons learned of relevance to Latin American and Caribbean
economies.  Each case study will review the origins of the specific national unemployment
system; analyze key program characteristics, including: the level and type of benefits and
the nature of the beneficiaries receiving funds; review the financing of the system;
examine its administration; and, discuss the broader labor market context in which the UI
program operates.  While key observations are listed with each case study, the final
chapter (IV) will specifically bring together the lessons learned and conclusions from these
cases for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Of the case studies examined in this section, three are within the Latin American and
Caribbean region, Argentina, Brazil, and Barbados, and four are outside, the United States,
Japan, Germany and Poland.  These case studies were selected based on a memorandum to
the sponsors of the study that sought to identify a diverse pool of case studies which could
provide a range of inputs and lessons learned for Latin America.  In particular, these case
studies offer some interesting distinctions:
•  Argentina.  A more recent (1992) Latin American unemployment insurance
system directed towards a comparatively small beneficiary pool.
•  Barbados.  The only unemployment insurance system operating in the
Caribbean with eligibility features adapted to an island economy.
•  Brazil.  The largest UI system in Latin America (in terms of beneficiaries) with
relatively short benefits (3-5 months) funded via a worker fund
(employer/employee contributions).
•  Germany.  An industrial country, integrated system that combines
unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance with job training and
placement for the unemployed.
•  Japan.  A relatively unique combination of unemployment benefits and smaller
"services" intended to prevent unemployment and retain workers in place.
•  Poland.  An unemployment insurance system instituted in the midst of dramatic
economic transition to ease large anticipated unemployment.- 14 -
•  United States.  A program of long standing, but relatively unique in its
operation at the state, rather than national level.  The U.S. system has another
relatively rare feature in that it calculates employer contributions on "experience
rating": the more an employer generates unemployment, the higher their rate of
contribution to unemployment insurance.
Following are seven case studies in alphabetical order.  These case studies are not intended
to be exhaustive or uniform in content.  Rather the intention is to summarize national
experience and draw out particular salient characteristics that are instructive to other
nations.  Chapter three explores the particular question of financing training and
unemployment insurance, drawing on the case study experience.  It should be emphasized
that these case studies were largely conducted based on literature reviews and phone
interviews.  Only the three Latin American and Caribbean case studies benefit from on-site
research.
 A.  ARGENTINA
1.  Origins of the System
Argentina's UI system is comparatively recent.  It was enacted in 1992 in the wake of a
macroeconomic crisis that raised the prospect of large-scale, official unemployment. Ex-
Labor Minister Armando Caro Figueroa explains that in 1991-92, unions and the country
were just beginning to shift from the image of full employment to a recognition of official,
sometimes large-scale unemployment that accompanied economic crisis.
9 As one trade
union official explained it, UI was a benefit that the unions accepted as part of a package
of responses to the crisis: "..it was a time of shock, inflation was very high."
10
To administrate the program, government officials turned to the social security system, in
particular the Asignaciones Familiares program, a family assistance program, since it had
in place a national network of offices and was used to managing monthly checks and
processing beneficiaries.  The program continues to remain under the administration of the
social security system, ANSES (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Nacional).
ANSES is a decentralized agency reporting to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.
2.  Financing
The program is financed by a 1.5% tax on employers and a 1% salary contribution by
workers.
3.  Current Labor Market Demands
The Argentine UI system serves a relatively small population -- roughly 100-
125,000/workers per month, an estimated 300,000 workers per year.  This represents only
                                                       
9Armando Caro Figueroa, interview with the author, 5 May 1998.
10Alberto Tomassone, Argentine Federation of Commercial and Service Workers (FAECYS), interview with the
author, 6 May 1998.- 15 -
about 15% of the officially unemployed workforce of two million.  Table 2.1 shows that
from 1994 on, after the initial establishment of the program, the number of workers served
per month varied by only 30,000 workers from 98,513 workers/month in 1994 to a high of
128,672 in 1997.
4.  Program Characteristics: Benefit Levels, Eligibility, and Analysis of Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  From the outset, the Argentine UI system was intended to apply to only a
segment of the labor force.  Public sector workers, domestics, and the self-employed were
explicitly excluded.  There is a separate program for construction workers instituted in
1967.   As construction is a sector that typically draws heavily on unemployment
insurance, this further keeps the level of beneficiaries down.  As in all UI systems,
informal sector workers are not eligible.  This came to be an increasingly important
characteristic that limited the applicability of the program, as over the time period from
1992 to today, the informal sector in Argentina has grown from approximately 25% to
40% in 1998.
11  For those who qualify in terms of the sector, they must have worked at
least 12 months out of the last 36 months and must have been laid off from their jobs due
to no fault of their own (sin justa causa).
Benefit Levels.  Workers are eligible for four to twelve months of assistance, depending
on how many years they have been working before the layoff.  The minimum benefit of
four months goes to those with only a year of employment in their former job; there are
eight months of benefits for those who have between two-three years at their former job.
The maximum benefit of one year of insurance payments goes to those with three or more
years on their former job.
Technically, workers can receive anywhere from $150 pesos/month to $300 pesos per
month plus a small additional stipend for family support, depending on their former salary.
In practice, though, there are very few applicants at this lower salary level.  The median
monthly UI benefit, including family payments, is currently 284 pesos/month, near the
maximum.  The median level of benefit as shown in Table 2.1 has not varied greatly in the
past three years, from 255 pesos/month to 284 (1998).  Median levels of benefits were
lower after 1995 as the government officially lowered the maximum amount of benefits a
worker was eligible for.
The Argentine benefit schedule has an additional characteristic, considered an important
trait of "optimal unemployment insurance" in economic modeling -- benefit levels that
decline over time.  This design feature is intended to try to encourage workers to return to
work as benefits become less valuable.  After the fourth month, benefit levels reduce to
85% of the level calculated in the first period; after nine months, the amount reduces to
70%.  It must be remembered, however, that these declining percentages apply to only the
segment of the beneficiaries eligible for a year of benefits, the rest of beneficiaries receive
a flat percentage for their shorter-term benefits.
                                                       
11Labor Minister Antonio Erman Gonzáles as reported in La Nación, 5 May 1998.- 16 -
Analysis of Beneficiaries.  The "typical" or average beneficiary of Argentine
unemployment insurance is a male (71% are male), between 24-49 years of age (70% fit
this category), without family responsibilities (52%).  Table 2.2 shows some of the
changes over time in the type of beneficiary receiving unemployment insurance.   The
most significant change overtime has been in the decrease in those who are heads of
households (con carga de familia), from 67% in 1994 to 48% in 1997.
Table 2.1
ARGENTINA:









1992 128.062 25.834.000 202
Monthly average 12.806 2.583.000
1993 880.479 325.193.000 369
Monthly average 72.373 27.009.000
1994 1.182.154 378.839.000 320
Monthly average 98.513 31.570.000
1995 1.468.160 374.992.000 255
Monthly average 122.347 31.249.000
1996 1.544.064 398.000.000 285
Monthly average 128.672 41.388.000
1997 1.144.548 313.800.000 274
Monthly average 95.379 26.160.000
1998 1/ 174.999 23.606 284
Monthly average 87.500 26.046
Source:  Dirección Nacional de Regulación del Mercado de Trabajo, using data from ANSeS.
1/  For two months only
While the age categories are not differentiated enough to see this clearly, this fits the
impression that over time those drawing on unemployment insurance are increasingly
younger with less work experience. The average length of benefits has dropped in the last
two years from 10.3 months to 8.27.
12
                                                       
12"Seguro de Desempleo," Data from the Dirección Nacional de Regulación del Mercado de Trabajo, 1998.- 17 -
Table 2.2
ARGENTINA:
CHARACTERISTICS OF UI BENEFICIARIES
(1994-1997)
Characteristic 1994 1995 1996 1997
Sex
              Female 23.50 26.40 27.50 29.10
              Male 76.50 73.60 72.50 70.90
Age Group
               Up to 24 years 7.40 9.60 9.90 9.60
               25-49 years 71.30 68.90 70.00 70.40
               50 years and over 21.30 21.50 20.00 20.00
Family Status
               w/o dependents 33.00 38.70 41.30 51.90
               w/dependents 67.00 61.30 58.70 48.10
Previous Occupation
                Professional/technical 18.20 15.00 21.40 2.90
                Directors and executives 0.40 0.50 0.60 4.50
                Administrative personnel 17.50 19.40 19.40 34.40
                Commercial and sales 6.10 9.10 10.20 3.70
                Private service sector 5.10 6.00 5.20 16.80
                Forestry and fishing 10.90 12.00 7.80 0.80
                Non-farm laborers and drivers 41.70 38.10 35.50 36.90
Line of Work in Previous Occupation
                 Primary activities 6.50 3.90 3.50 3.70
                 Manufacturing industry 45.10 45.10 42.30 37.20
                 Commerce 18.30 23.40 24.00 25.00
                 Financial and managerial services 20.40 16.10 14.10 13.30
                 Social and personal services 8.70 10.00 14.00 18.00
                 Other 1.00 1.40 2.00 2.80
   Source:  Dirección Nacional de Regulación del Mercado de Trabajo, using data from ANSES
While often there is the impression that a program such as unemployment insurance plays
a social safety net role in protecting incomes for low-income workers, the population
served is typically not the lowest income levels, and this is true in the Argentine case.
Table 2.3 shows that only 6% of beneficiaries made 300 pesos/month or less (February
1998).  The majority of applicants (51%) are in the range from 300 - 600 pesos per month,
but surprisingly 17% of recipients had salaries in excess of 1,000/pesos a month, more
than three times the maximum benefit level they receive from unemployment insurance.
This trend to serve middle-income recipients is reinforced by data on the occupational- 18 -
profile of beneficiaries (Table 2.2).  Non-agricultural workers and chauffeurs comprise a
third of recipients, but another third is represented by administrative personnel.
Table 2.3
ARGENTINA
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF UI BENEFICIARIES
(February 1998)
Income Intervals Total Percentage of
Beneficiaries
0 to 100 56 0.1%
101 to 200 951 1.1% 6.1%
201 to 300 4,216 4.9%
301 to 400 12,645 14.6%
401 to 500 19,371 22.4%
501 to 600 11,787 13.6%
601 to 700 8,315
701 to 800 6,640 7.7%
801 to 900 4,523 5.2%
901 to 1.000 3,545 4.1%
1.001 to 1.500 9,373 10.8%
1.501 to 2.000 2,986 3.3%
2.001 to 2.500 1,066 1,2% 16.6%
2.501 to 3.000 485 0.6%
3.000 to 4.000 368 0.4%
4.001 and More 229 0.3%
Total 86,466 100.0%
Source: Dirección Nacional de Regulación del Mercado de Trabajo, using data from ANSeS
One factor to remember in the Latin American context is that low-income workers are
disproportionately represented in the informal sector.  Since unemployment insurance
covers only formal sector workers, and then within the formal sector those with significant
tenure in one job, it rarely could fulfill a social safety net function for low-income
workers.  What is interesting in the Argentine context is that even though benefit levels are
kept relatively low (300 peso/month maximum), the program attracts workers of far higher
income levels.  In this way, UI plays a role more like a short-term income subsidy -- which
is how it is commonly referred to in Argentina (subsidio al desempleo) -- than a program
which replaces/protects incomes for a period of job-hunting.
5.  Administration
As explained above, the program is administered through the social security system.
Workers go to one of 150 local ANSES offices to register and receive their checks; there
are no other labor market functions or job hunting services provided.- 19 -
Trade union leaders and other observers of the system interviewed detected few significant
administrative problems with the system.  Workers who are eligible for UI were generally
informed of their eligibility and received their payments on a timely basis.  There were
some problems with workers not receiving their termination notices, or termination notices
being a matter of "negotiation" with some employers, but this does not appear to be an all-
pervasive problem.
What is less controlled are the administrative mechanisms and procedures to exclude from
unemployment benefits those workers who have found new jobs.  Numbers to identify
workers (a CUIL, akin to the a Social Security number in the United States) were not
instituted until 1994, and only very recently has the government been cross-checking the
CUILs of UI recipients with the social security payments rolls to see if the UI recipient is
actually working in formal sector employment and paying into the social security system.
In doing so, the government has been able to detect significant numbers of UI recipients
who were actually working in the formal sector while receiving unemployment benefits.
Far greater numbers of UI beneficiaries are likely to be working in the informal sector, but
this is nearly impossible to identify.  The low level of benefits -- near the minimum wage -
- reduces much incentive to go after this type of fraud.
Interviewees noted there is not a lot of urgency to expand or change the current UI system
beyond its 100-125,000 beneficiary level.  Proposals to change the system have been floated
in the past, but are not in active consideration at this time.  Trade union and business officials
indicated that other labor market programs and trends have a more prominent place in the
national agenda, in particular, severance pay and temporary contracts.  With the institution of
temporary work contracts, approximately 80% of new jobs are temporary in nature.
6.  Key Observations: Argentina
•  Small Program Dimensioning.  A striking feature of the Argentine system is
its relatively small size and small variability in number of beneficiaries
(@100,000-125,000/month), even as unemployment levels increase.  Across
the board, interviewees attributed this first to the number of groups explicitly
excluded from receiving UI (e.g., domestic workers, construction, public sector)
and the growing informal sector that is not covered by UI.  But they also
pointed out that another factor is the willingness of the government to intervene
and reduce benefits when the costs/number of beneficiaries are likely to exceed
incoming revenues from the private sector.  The government has reduced, on at
least two occasions, the maximum amount of pesos a worker can receive in
unemployment benefits, most recently in 1995, when the "tequila effect" forced
up unemployment levels.  While not typical of other UI programs, Argentina's
operates with a broad, informal understanding of the constrained parameters of
the program.  The 1.5% tax on payroll contributed by the private sector is
considered the limit of what they will contribute. As a result, the program must
be adjusted to more or less match the incoming revenues.- 20 -
•  Lack of Integration with Labor Market Operations/Current Role and
Purpose.  The Argentine UI system is run through the social security system
and has no linkage to training or other labor market programs.  Once eligibility
is determined, it is a straightforward process to receive cash benefits.  Workers
apply for benefits in a social security/social assistance office and are not
required, directed, or provided with information on finding new employment or
training opportunities.  Formally, the law says a UI recipient must accept a job
offered by the Labor Ministry, but observers indicated that there is no actual
labor intermediation performed. The constrained size of the program (limited
number of beneficiaries), coupled with the lack of integration with labor market
operations led a number of interviewees to maintain that the program had little
impact and, for others, to question what role it performed in the economy. Does
it protect income during a period of unemployment and reward labor market
attachment?  Is the program intended to help workers reenter the labor market?
•  Interplay/Function with Severance Payments.  Unemployment insurance's
relatively minor role in the Argentine labor market can be understood, in large
part, when compared against severance payments which workers receive upon
job termination.  Under current Argentine law, a worker receives one month of
salary for every year worked, with a minimum of two months severance pay
after working only three months.  In principle, severance pay is distinct from
self-insured UI in that workers and employers pay into the pool of funds.
Severance pay is paid only by employers and is designed to serve as a
disincentive to employers to layoff workers as well as to compensate workers
for long-term job investment.  While their purpose may be different, both pay
cash benefits upon a worker’s termination.  In practical terms in Argentina, the
amounts received by workers are typically much larger and less restrictive for
severance pay than for unemployment insurance.  UI pays near the minimum
wage for a maximum of a year and is received once a month.  Severance pay is
paid in one lump sum.  For higher income workers, just a few months of
severance pay would be equivalent to all their UI benefits.  Further, fewer
workers are eligible for UI -- with UI a worker must have a year's worth of
service, with severance only two months.  With unemployment insurance being
a solely cash benefit, that is, having no conditions or provision to look for a job
or receive training to get the benefit, UI and severance pay in Argentina have
similar attributes.
•  Potential Distorting Role of the Informal Sector.  Since the UI program was
first created in Argentina in 1992, the labor market has shifted dramatically to
greater informality, roughly doubling from 25% to 40% in 1998.  There are
many factors influencing this trend; economists prominently cite the avoidance
of high levels of taxation/benefits on formal sector work, which can comprise
50% of labor costs.- 21 -
Given this looming role of the informal sector, many believe -- from the government,
private sector, and trade unions -- that there is a high number of Argentine workers
receiving UI who are also working in the informal sector.  This would undermine one of
the fundamental precepts of UI – that beneficiaries be available to work and are actively
seeking new employment.  The Argentine UI system has only recently begun to
investigate and exclude those workers who are receiving UI and working in the formal
sector.  This is accomplished by checking the employees' number to insure they are not
receiving UI and also paying into the social security system.  But no UI system has an
effective way to screen out beneficiaries who are working "off the books."  The incentive
to seek work in the informal sector is reinforced by the relatively low level of benefits for
UI in Argentina.  Indeed, in Spanish, many referred to the program as an unemployment
subsidy (subsidio de desempleo) rather than benefit.  More disturbing was a trend, noted
by a range of officials, that employers may be entering into informal agreements to layoff
employees but them rehire them as contractors off the books. Unemployment insurance
then serves as a short-term cushion against the loss of income in the transition from formal
to informal sector work.
13.  It is not known how significant is this trend in Argentina, but it
is noteworthy that it was mentioned by so many interviewees across the business, trade
union, government and academic communities.  With a program as small as the one in
Argentina, this trend is not likely to have been a significant factor in the sharp rise in
informality in the Argentine labor market.  The question for Latin American and
Caribbean economies with large informal sectors is whether UI is able to effectively serve
its intended purpose and whether the program contributes to, or at least reinforces, trends
towards greater informal employment.  The concluding chapter (IV) presents a fuller
discussion of UI in the informal sector drawing on information from a number of case
studies in this report.
 B. BARBADOS
1.  Origins of the System
Unemployment insurance in the Caribbean is unique; Barbados has the only program.  Its
program arises out of a longer tradition of social insurance advocated by trade union
leaders on the island beginning in the 1960s.  Unemployment insurance, part of this social
insurance tradition, specifically came into being in 1982, following the 1981 economic
crisis.  Large layoffs at the time (in the 1000s) prompted consideration to providing a
greater safety net to workers through self-insurance.  A parliamentary dialogue over
unemployment insurance grew and included efforts to look at other international systems -
- Germany, the United States, and England, in particular -- to craft a scheme for Barbados.
As Prime Minister Adams described the UI program's purpose in 1981, it was to provide
the temporarily unemployed with "some source of funds to permit those unfortunate
                                                       
13 This can be seen as akin to a short-term preferred interest rate on a credit card or loan which might induce, or
at least reinforce, a particular purchase.- 22 -
persons to meet essential expenses and so maintain their purchasing power and cushion
their families against hardships."
14
Workers and employers paid into the new UI system for one year to build up its reserves;
workers were then eligible to receive benefits the following year in 1983.  Initially workers
received 40% of their former salary for up to thirteen weeks a year.  This was raised to
60% and 26 weeks in 1985.
This new system of unemployment insurance was considered distinct from severance pay,
which was enacted in 1967.  Severance pay was intended to compensate for a worker’s
human resources investment in the firm.  Nonetheless, some linkage was recognized, for
an agreement was made with business leaders that as UI came into being a cap was put on
the maximum amount and number of years of eligibility for severance pay.
2.  Program Characteristics: Benefit Levels, Eligibility, and Analysis of  Beneficiaries
For the Latin America/Caribbean region, the Barbadian UI system provides a relatively
generous stipend -- 60% of a workers' former salary -- over a moderate period for a
maximum of 26 weeks per year.  The Barbadian system has a number of features which
ease eligibility and make it adaptable to a cyclical, island economy, including allowing
workers to receive their 26 weeks non-continuously.
Eligibility and Benefit Levels.  The program is open to salaried workers from the ages of
16 to 64 who pay into the system.  The self-employed are not covered nor are permanent
government workers because they have lifelong contracts (temporary government workers
are eligible.)  A person must be insured (i.e., have made payments into the system) for 52
weeks, and must have at least seven contributions paid or credited in the quarter preceding
the quarter in which unemployment is paid.  A person can receive a "credit" for a
contribution to UI when they are receiving another insurance benefit, such as maternity
leave, or injury claim.  If a worker is fired due to his or her own negligence, they are still
eligible for UI but are disqualified for a specific period.  Germany and a number of other
OECD countries permit such eligibility; in other systems, such as many state programs in
the United States, workers cannot quit their job and collect unemployment insurance.
Qualifying workers are provided up to 26 weeks a year (non-continuous) of benefits at
60% of their original salary, up to a maximum salary of B$715/week.  The average claim
period is about 10 weeks and has remained so over the last five years.
15
Analysis of Beneficiaries/Demand by Industry.  The Barbadian UI system is unusual in
the region in its relatively even distribution of male and female recipients.  Table 2.4
shows figures for 1996 with 49% female to 51% male recipients, which has been relatively
consistent over time.  While a specific analysis has not been done in Barbados regarding
                                                       
14Prime Minister Adams, Financial Statement and Budgetary Proposals, Barbados, 1981 as quoted in Mr.
Grantley Smith and Mrs. Averille White, "The Experience in the Establishment and Administration of
Unemployment Insurance and Severance Payment Schemes in Barbados", The National Insurance Office,
Barbados, 1991.
15Averille White, interview with author, 17 August 1998.- 23 -
the type of beneficiaries, some explanatory factors for the less skewed sex ratios might
include: the inclusion of part-time work (minimum of $21 weekly) and private household
employees (yet only 5% of total recipients) in the system; and, the high representation of
the service/hotel/retail sector in both the economy and the UI program.  Table 2.5 shows
the industry breakdown of UI claims in terms of days paid for three time periods, one of
which (1992) was the height of demand for the program.  These data shows the principal
demands on the program have been for employees in the hotel/retail sector (40%) and the
manufacturing sector (18% in 1996).  The distribution among employment sectors has
undergone only a few shifts, as government temporary employees and the
transport/communications sector drew on the system particularly during the structural
adjustment period, 14% and 8.8% respectively in 1992, but fell back to 2% and 4.3%
respectively by 1996.
Beyond data on recipient’s sex and industry classification, there is not much more detailed
analysis on the beneficiary pool conducted on a yearly basis.  Table 2.4 provides
additional data on recipients in 1996 in terms of their original earnings.  It shows that 54%
are in the band from B$101-350/week, (69.5% from B$101-450), 10% earned more that
B$651.  While men and women receive UI benefits in roughly equal numbers, the women
are more concentrated at lower income levels.  A third of female recipients earned less
than B$200, while only 15% of men did.- 24 -
Table 2.4
BARBADOS




Female Male Total % of Total
$21 - $50 386 247 633 0.7%
$51 - $100 1,946 767 2,716 2.8%
$101 - $200 13,458 6,491 19,949 20.1%
$201 - $250 5,316 5,183 10,499 10.9% 69.50%
$251 - $350 9,889 12,522 22,411 23.3%
$351 - $450 5,963 8,704 14,667 15.2%
$451 - $550 3,496 5,560 9,056 9.4%
$551 - $600 1,569 2,112 3,681 3.8%
$601 - $650 1,241 1,704 2,945 3.2%
$651 - $714 3,740 5,506 9,246 9.6%
$715 197 419 616 0.6%
Total 47,204 49,215 96,419
Source: National Insurance Office, Barbados
Table 2.5
BARBADOS:










Agriculture 22,261 2.7 19,923 3.9 14,189 3.5
Fishing 2,092 0.3 2,701 0.5 1,353 0.3
Mining and Well Digging 7,840 0.9 5,589 1.1 2,707 0.7
Manufacturing 168,120 20.3 111,556 22.0 74,595 18.2
Electricity, Gas and Water 728 0.1 1,105 0.2 2,378 0.6
Construction and Installation 88,643 10.7 34,791 6.9 38,712 9.4
Hotel and Restaurant Wholesale/Retail 231,540 27.9 203,814 40.2 163,460 39.9
Transport and Communication 73,606 8.9 20,190 4.0 17,429 4.3
Financial Services 38,339 4.6 40,468 8.0 39,532 9.6
Government and Defense 115,417 13.9 8,517 1.7 7,997 2.0
Community Services 42,605 5.1 23,519 4.6 23,621 5.8
Private Household and Other 36,937 4.5 27,192 5.4 20,504 5.0
International and Territorial Bodies 684 0.1 7,512 1.5 3,609 0.9
Total 828,812 100 506,877 100 410,086 100
  Source: National Insurance Office, Barbados- 25 -
3.  Financing
The program is currently financed through a 3% levy -- 1.5% (of total payroll) paid by
employers, 1.5% (of wages) paid by workers.
4.  Administration
UI is administrated under the National Insurance program, which administers all the
principal forms of social insurance: pensions, health, maternity, sickness, and, employment
injury.  Within two weeks of losing their job, a worker should report to the unemployment
benefit branch office to initiate a claim.  Every two weeks, a worker must return to the
office and certify that they have been out of work but available to work in order to receive
the next payment.  These certificates and applications are sent back to the main National
Insurance office where they are reviewed and processed manually.  Without the aid of
computers, the process is very labor-intensive.  In some cases it can take 4-6 weeks to
receive payment.
16  Overall, trade unionists did not detect major complaints by workers on
the administration of the program.
17
5.  Current Labor Market Demands
Barbados is experiencing relatively positive growth and lower unemployment following a
difficult period of structural adjustment in the early 1990s.  Demand for unemployment
insurance was highest in 1992 with over 20,000 claims received and B$27 million in
benefits paid.
18   The number of claims has declined steadily since then along with
unemployment, with a small increase in 1996.  The total registered claims in 1997 were
12,105.  This shows demand for the UI program being fairly cyclical.  Current official
unemployment rates for Barbados are approximately 14%,
19 with proportionately higher
rates for women and youth.  Barbados’ unemployment rate is not easily comparable to
other nations as it includes more people in its definition.  In particular, the "reference
period" for counting the unemployed  -- those who are without work but looked for work
in the past three months -- is longer than in many other countries and thus includes those
who other systems define as out of the workforce.  Nonetheless, unemployment is a
persistent problem in Barbados, particularly for women and youth.  The unemployment
insurance system can be seen to perform a compensating effect in economic downturns.
As the Director of the National Insurance Office described the system, "It’s not that
important until you need it."
20
                                                       
16Mr. Cecil Henry, interview with author, 17 August 1998.
17Senator Leroy Trotman and Robert Morris, Deputy General Secretary, Barbados Workers Union, interview
with author, 18 August 1998.
18Central Bank of Barbados, Economic and Financial Statistics, ISSN 0378-178X, Central Bank of Barbados,
April 1998, Table D5.  Recall that number of claims likely exceeds number of beneficiaries as some beneficiaries
can file more than one claim in a year.  In 1996, the difference was about 1,000.
19 Basic Socio-Economic Data for 19 April 1999, Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit, Integration and
Regional Programs Department, Inter-American Development Bank.
20Lloyd Bradshaw, interview, 18 August 1998.- 26 -
6.  Key Observations: Barbados
•  Unusual and Large Surplus.  The most striking and unusual feature of the
Barbadian system is that it is running a very large surplus.  It is hard to think
of another system like this. The accumulated surplus is currently $108 million,
while only $14 million or so is needed each year to pay out benefits (roughly
9,000 recipients/12,000 claims in 1996).  This surplus is in addition to a one-
time transfer of $50 million from UI to the National Insurance fund made in
January 1997 when the unemployment insurance fund was formally separated
from the rest of National Insurance. For a system that was originally designed
as a "pay as you go", how did the surplus get so large?  The principal reason is
that the government raised the contribution rate quite dramatically to 5.5%
(total) during the structural adjustment years,
21 left it at this higher level too
long, then reduced it to a total of 3% and that was still too high for the
demand for the program.  Figure 2 displays the annual contributions vs.
benefit expenditures of the Barbadian UI system since 1982, showing
unusually large surpluses of contributions over expenditures in 1992 (B$28.6
million) and 1993 (B$38.6 million) which has continued steadily to today.
The program is still running surpluses far in excess of what is needed to
cover demand even in a recession.  A recent Actuarial Report for the
National Insurance Scheme recommended that contributions to the
                                                       
21The combined rates for workers and firms were increased from 1% to 2.75% in October 1991, and then in
December 1991 from 2.75% to 5.5% (2.75% workers/firms).
Figure 2
BARBADOS UNEMPLOYMENT FUND:
CONTRIBUTIONS Vs. BENEFITS EXPENDITURES 1982-96
(in million B$)













































































































unemployment fund be reduced from 3% to 1.5% and the balance switched
to the National Insurance Fund, which sorely needs the funds.  They
estimated the "break even" contribution rate to be 1.1% assuming
unemployment remained at current levels.
22 This recommendation has been
raised in preliminary discussions of members of the National Insurance
Board, but no formal action to change the UI contribution rate has yet been
made.
•  Reduced Incentives for Cost Savings.  The existence of this large surplus
generates few immediate pressures to constrain the numbers of people
receiving UI or constrain costs through administrative efficiencies or greater
restrictions on eligibility. In terms of eligibility, Barbadian UI has a number of
features that make it easier to qualify for than in other nations.  For example, a
worker does not need to be fully employed for the period preceding
qualification of unemployment.  He or she may be "credited" time if they
were receiving other benefits, such as disability or maternity benefit.  As well,
workers who were dismissed "with cause" (i.e., they quit or didn't show up for
the job and were fired) can receive a reduced level of UI in Barbados whereas
in some other systems they would be totally ineligible for any benefit.
Despite this more generous eligibility, there has not been surging demand for
UI benefits.  UI benefits reached a height of 20,396 claims during the 1992
economic crisis and in the last two years (1996-97) have averaged about
12,000 claims filed.
The benefits administration is highly labor-intensive as it is yet to be
computerized.  Bi-monthly payments are recorded by hand for each recipient
in a cumbersome filing system.  Interviewees indicate that computerization of
the UI system has been promised and anticipated for some time.  Doing so
would allow for much greater efficiencies and free up administrative time to
more closely monitor fraud and eligibility.  Further administrative
improvements would speed the delivery of UI checks to recipients as the
current time lag can range from 4-6 weeks.
•  Features Adapted to Cyclical, Island Economy.  The Barbadian system has
a number of features/eligibility criteria that reflect its use in a cyclical island
economy where key sectors have highly seasonal demands for labor.  The UI
system is intended to adapt to this.  While the tourist season covers more
months of the year than in the past, there is still higher differential demand for
certain occupations because of tourism trends.  Workers are eligible for a total
of 26 weeks of benefits in any 52-week period.  This permits some workers to
go on and off unemployment insurance for seasonal work.  Workers are
eligible to receive UI payments if they are laid off every other week (i.e., they
work one-week on, then one-week on unemployment) as long as they don't
                                                       
22Ninth Actuarial Report of the Operation of the Barbados National Insurance Scheme as at 31 December 1996
(Bridgetown: Barbados National Insurance Board, February 1998), 3.- 28 -
exceed the maximum of 26 weeks of yearly UI benefits.  This permits key
employers in the hotel sector, for example, to keep a larger workforce at their
disposal by relying on UI to supplement workers incomes every other week.
Other systems bar the return to unemployment insurance with a longer
disqualifying period to discourage such seasonal use.  Like most systems that
do not have an experience rating, certain sectors/firms benefit
disproportionately from having a UI system as they make greater demands on
it.
To insure that workers do not leave the island and continue to receive
unemployment insurance the Barbadian system requires that workers
physically appear at the UI office once every two weeks, present their photo
ID and certify that they have not worked.  In other systems, checks are issued
on a monthly basis.  This requirement for physical presentation to the National
Office would be much more difficult to achieve in larger countries.
•  Poor Connections to Labor Market Intermediation and Training.  While
legally all workers receiving UI are supposed to register with the national
employment service, in practice they are not compelled to and many do not.
The National Employment Bureau (NEB) office (run by the Labor Ministry)
was located right next to the unemployment office (run by the National
Insurance Office) in 1987 to facilitate interaction.  Still, most find the service
not worth the time, particularly after a long wait to register every two weeks
for their UI benefit check.  There is also not the staff (3 persons in the main
office) or job registry at the Service to service the roughly 1,800 claims a
month for UI.  The NEB's job listings include a few special overseas
programs (e.g., Canada, U.S. cruise ships), low and semi-skilled work and
fewer professional listings.  The main office for the National Employment
Service had a registry of 327 persons registered as of March 1998, an
accumulated total of just 780 persons.
23 A number of interviewees believed
some workers simply waited until their unemployment ran out before looking
for a job.
There is even less linkage with the training system.  A national training levy is
assessed on employers and pooled into a consolidated fund managed by the
Ministry of Finance.  The fund finances a number of training initiatives,
including the Barbados Vocational Training Board and an employment and
training fund of the Labor Ministry for training within firms.  Workers,
though, as in many systems are not eligible to be receiving UI and training,
unless they can demonstrate that they are still available to work.  There is no
central information for workers and firms about available training programs
on the island.
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•  Function with Severance Payments.  As in most systems in the region that
have both UI and severance pay, there are questions raised as to the
interaction/potential duplication of unemployment insurance benefits with
mandated severance payments.
24  Both provide cash benefits on termination
of employment.  Severance pay is typically intended to both discourage
termination and reward a worker for the human capital investment made in
the firm.  UI was considered to be a self-insurance system, contributed equally
by workers and business owners, to protect against short-term income loss
from short periods of unemployment.   Severance pay currently provides
workers who have two years working for the same firm with 2.5 weeks of
salary each year for up to 10 years service; 3 weeks from 10-20 years service;
and 3.5 weeks for 20-33 years service.  With between one and two year’s
service, a worker is only eligible for unemployment insurance.
There was consideration given in Barbados in the 1980s to merging the two
systems.  Colis Blackman, President of the Barbados Employers Federation,
maintains that the private sector was largely unsupportive of UI in the 1980s
as they considered it too similar to severance.  However, severance was cut
back from 4 weeks/year to 2.5 weeks, and UI moved up to play a more
important supplemental role in easing employment transitions.  "If it wasn't
for UI, we'd be in trouble," he explains.
25  Overall, the private sector in
Barbados relies on the social insurance system to provide benefits that, in
other nations, are financed directly by private companies.  This includes
health benefits, maternity, and injury and sickness claims.  Mr. Blackman did
not find a high concern among the private sector for revising UI and
severance pay,
26 even though Barbados has the only UI program in the
Caribbean and could be seen as having a competitive disadvantage in terms of
labor costs.  A more worrisome trend noted is the rise in the employment
injury claims whose benefits are more generous than UI.  Injury claims
increased nearly 30% from 1996 to 97 to 7,347 claims.
27  The important
evolution over time for UI, if two systems (severance + UI) were to be
maintained, is to use UI more proactively in linking workers with jobs and
training so that it truly becomes a vehicle for transitioning from one job to the
another.
                                                       
24See Inter-American Development Bank, Labor Markets and Competitiveness in Barbados, Inter-American
Development Bank, Economic and Sector Study Series, RE3-97-003, October 1997.
25Colis Blackman, interview with author, 18 August 1998.
26A similar conclusion about lack of private sector interest in reforming severance pay was reached in interviews
for the IDB study, Labor Markets and Competitiveness in Barbados.
27New Insight: Magazine of the National Insurance Office, Barbados (Bridgetown: National Insurance Office,
Barbados, January-April 1993), 3.- 30 -
 C.  BRAZIL
1.  Origins of the System
The current unemployment insurance system was created in 1986 in response to the
macroeconomic crisis and its shock therapy, the cruzado plan.  One key participant at the
time recalls that the decision to implement the program was made relatively quickly in a
crisis atmosphere of rising unemployment without much time for planning on the specific
program or its administration.
28  UI was seen as one way to help stabilize unemployment
amidst heterodox economic shock; it was thus seen initially, as a "pure benefit" in times of
need rather than a labor market transition tool.
29  Owing to these origins, unemployment
benefits in Brazil were conceived of as a very short-term measure -- three to five months --
and have remained a highly short-term instrument today.
Because UI was needed to respond to an imminent crisis, the original managers felt they
had few administrative options for getting the program up and running.  For the initial
years, unemployment benefit checks were issued through local post offices, which
reinforced the benefit image of the program.  This initial delivery mechanism did not work
all that well, with some workers initially waiting as much as a year for their checks.
It was in 1990, when a larger development fund called the Fundo do Amparo ao
Trabalhador (FAT) was created, that the program was placed on a more secure financial
basis, underwent broader administrative and operational changes, and eligibility was
expanded to a wider range of workers.  The FAT serves as a major financing mechanism
for employment, development, and training initiatives.  Its major programs include:
unemployment insurance, the Brazilian National Development Bank BNDES (Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social-BNDES which gets 40% of the FAT), a
13th month salary bonus for workers (bono salarial), a fiscal stabilization fund, and
training initiatives apart from SENAI/SENAC.  Employers and employees contribute to
the fund which is managed by the Labor Ministry with a tri-partite (business-government-
labor) governing board called the CODEFAT.  In the change, the program was moved out
of the postal system and into a mixed administrative system via the Ministry of Labor,
which uses an amalgam of local state banks and different municipal offices to register
recipients and deliver checks.
2.  Program Characteristics: Eligibility, Benefit Levels, and Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  The Brazilian UI program is open to workers with a formal labor contract who
meet the criteria for amount of time worked and were laid off involuntarily.  The worker
cannot be fired or leave voluntarily to receive benefits; the layoff must be the result of an
employer decision not the result of the worker's actions.  Brazil has a separate special
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29Chahad, interview, May 13, 1998.- 31 -
unemployment insurance program for those working in fisheries in artisan (small scale)
forms (Pescador Artesanal).
When the UI program first started a worker had to have been working three out of the
previous four years to be eligible for benefits.  Today, a worker only has to have worked
six months out of the last three years to receive the minimum benefit -- a significant
change in the "labor force attachment" needed to qualify for insurance.   A worker must
wait 16 months after receiving unemployment benefits before being eligible again.
Benefit Levels.  Brazilian UI is short-term and provided at relatively low benefit levels.
Typically, benefits are provided for 3-5 months depending on the length of time in
employment.  The government has expanded the length of time for benefits during special
periods from 4-6 months.
30  The length of benefits are determined thusly: workers with a
minimum of six and maximum of 11 months of prior employment earn three monthly
payments (parcelas); four parcelas for 12-23 months of service; and five parcelas for
more than 24 months of service.  One can see that, as constructed, the benefit structure
does not scale up significantly for workers who have greater labor force experience (many
years of employment).
The amount of unemployment insurance received depends on the worker’s former income
within a specific band.  The benefit varies from the minimum wage ($120 reales/month) to
a maximum of twice the minimum wage (R$224.54); the higher amounts are for workers
having a previous salary over $330.21 reales/month.
31  Table 2.6 displays the beneficiary
levels, expenditures, and median benefit levels of the Brazilian UI system.  It demonstrates
that the average beneficiary earns a bit more than 1.5 times the minimum wage. This
average is down slightly from the early 1990s.
                                                       
 30At the end of 1997, the maximum period of benefits was extended to six months, and in January 1998 returned
to five months.  The governing board of the FAT (the CODEFAT) is also authorized to extend the benefit period
to 12 months for certain groups on an exceptional basis.




UI BENEFICIARIES AND BENEFIT LEVELS
(1986-1998)





1986 204.324 16.006.745 -
1987 999.967 166.289.225 1.15
1988 1.322.432 198.767.074 1.22
1989 1.912.185 398.393.493 1.7
1990 3.099.910 1.236.731.294 1.75
1991 3.724.840 1.412.893.566 1.83
1992 4.015.225 1.440.626.233 1.69
1993 3.830.420 1.559.105.700 1.41
1994 4.091.318 1.846.798.526 1.55
1995 4.789.307 3.146.551.407 1.54
1996 4.395.977 3.289.268.149 1.56
1997 4.428.757 3.200.247.989 1.57
1998 739.091 547.898.179 1.58
TOTAL 37.553.753 18.459.587.587 1.55
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Labor
Analysis of Beneficiaries.  In absolute terms, the Brazilian UI system is the largest in
Latin America.  It currently serves an average of 300,000-400,000 beneficiaries per month,
over four million beneficiaries a year.  The average recipient is male, in the services or
industrial sector, 35 or younger with an eighth grade education.
As the Brazilian program has expanded over time, statistics published by the Brazilian
Ministry of Labor
32 indicate that recipients have continued to be relatively young, but
increasingly at relatively higher former incomes.  Male recipients have heavily dominated
the beneficiary pool, with women typically comprising approximately 20-30% of all
beneficiaries, 30% in the most recent calendar year (1997).  Fully one-half of recipients
are only 30 years old or less, which is particularly striking in comparison to other UI
systems that emphasize rewarding long-term commitment to the labor force.  More than
one-quarter of these are 18-24 years old.  Fewer and fewer low-income people benefit
from the program.  As Table 2.7 demonstrates, in 1992, 11% of recipients had previous
incomes of the minimum wage or below.  By 1997, this percentage has been cut in half,
with only 5.9% at this income level.  Nearly 12% earn more than five times the minimum
wage.  There have been less striking shifts overtime in the educational level of recipients.
Nearly one-half (45%) of recipients have an eighth grade education or better.  Since 1992,
the educational level of recipients has shifted upward slightly.  In 1992, 39% of recipients
had a fourth grade education or less; in 1997, this figure was 31%.
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Table 2.7
BRAZIL:
UI BENEFICIARIES BY FORMER SALARY: 1992 and 1997
(in increments of the minimum wage)
Former salary 1992 % of total 1997 % of total % change
Less than .5 20,845 0.5 9,337 0.2 -0.3
.51 – 1.0 423,995 10.9 248,308 5.7 -5.2
1.01 – 1.5 820,355 21.1 657,899 15.0 -6.1
1.51 – 2.0 726,260 18.7 751,277 17.1 -1.5
2.01 – 3.0 851,534 21.9 1,298,416 29.6 7.7
3.01 – 5.0 600,996 15.5 895,354 20.4 5
5.01 – 10.0 285,477 7.3 385,978 8.8 1.5
More than 10 87,436 2.2 128,932 2.9 0.7
Unknown 69,780 1.8 6,848 0.2 -1.6
TOTAL 3,886,678 100.0 4,382,349 100.0 0.2
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Finance
3.  Financing
Employers pay into the "FAT" (Fundo do Amparo ao Trabalhador) which funds a series
of labor market and development programs.  There are a number of different taxes on
employers that finance the FAT, but largely a .65% tax on total business sales goes to
finance UI.
4.  Administration
If a worker is dismissed, the employer is required to give them a form that they can then
use to apply for unemployment insurance.  The Brazilian worker has three different types
of offices they could bring their application to: the state-supported banks, the caixas
economicas federales (there is an office in every municipality), an office of the Ministry of
Labor (there are four separate types),
33 or a local employment service office (SINE).  Once
the application is made and approved, the worker receives his benefit checks through the
CEF local bank.  With eligibility fairly clear, there is currently a high rate of acceptance of
original applications (rate of habilitation), well over 90%.
The centralized, yet three-alternative delivery system, plus the contracting out of data
processing to DATAMEC, who subcontracts further to Método, contributes to multi-
agency montage used to administer the program. While there are three options available,
the most preferred option of workers is to register and receive their checks from the state
                                                       
33Delegacias Regionais do Trabalho (DRT), Subdelegacias do Trabalho (SDT), Postos Regionais do Trabalho
(PRT), and Postos Locais do Trabalho (PLT).- 34 -
banks (the CEFs).  These function like typical neighborhood or commercial banks and
there is little stigma attached to going there.
5.  Key Observations: Brazil
•  Weakening Connection Between Unemployment and UI Demand.  Despite
Brazilian UI being short-term and at relatively low income levels (1.5 times the
minimum wage), the demand for the program is relatively high with substantial
budgetary costs to the country.  Figure 3 shows annual costs reaching near
US$3.5 billion.  Demand, though, seems to rise less in response to economic
cycles than to eligibility for the program.  In the Brazilian case, other factors
continue to push costs and the number of beneficiaries up.  Growth of the labor
force is one factor, but importantly, so is the easing of criteria for eligibility and
temporary expansions of the length of benefits.  An increase can be seen
particularly in 1990 where the first expansion of eligibility occurs.  In 1994,
there was a further easing of eligibility and a temporary extension in the length
of monthly payments; another bulge can be noted in contrast to the official
unemployment rate.  While the easing of eligibility typically is intended to
respond to worsening economic circumstances, the unemployment rate does not
appear to rise as sharply.  Some observers believe that some of the disconnect
between demand for UI and unemployment rates might also be related to
fraudulent claims.  The size of the program also puts stresses on an
administrative structure that was originally intended to serve only 100,000
workers a month; currently the rate is triple that.
34
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Proposiçoes de Aperfeiçoamento, Rio de Janeiro, Centro de Estudos de Políticas Públicas, December, 1992, 78.- 35 -
•  Increasing Use by Young and Better Off.  Demand for the program will
likely continue to be strong in a young labor force where eligibility for
unemployment insurance is so generous as to require only six months of work
in a three-year period.  As the analysis of beneficiaries above demonstrates, the
system increasingly is being utilized by the young (30 years or less) as well as
by the relatively better off.   Nearly 12% of recipients earn more than five times
the minimum wage, while only 6% earn the minimum wage or less.  This trend
away from poor recipients is reinforced by the concentration of the poor in
informal employment, where they are ineligible for UI.  The question in each
national context is whether the resulting beneficiary pool of UI is the one policy
makers want to serve.  In Latin America, UI is often talked of as one of a
number of potential "safety net" programs, because of the region’s large, poor
populations.  However, the concluding chapter will raise questions about UI’s
utility as a social safety net for the region based on the case experiences in this
study.
•  Poor Integration with Labor Market Programs.  Brazilian UI is an isolated
instrument: it has very weak connections to the national employment service
(SINE) and virtually none to the extensive Brazilian training system.  While
workers have a choice whether to register for UI at a state employment agency,
few typically do.  In the case of Sao Paulo, for example, only 2% did so, with
the others going to the Caixas Economicas Federales (CEFs), (56%) or offices
of the Ministry of Labor (41%).
35  National figures for 1997 show that the
reliance on the employment service offices for insuring beneficiaries was 23%,
ranging from 9% in the Southeast (including Sao Paulo, Rio, Minas Gerais),
where the most beneficiaries are, to 57% in the South (Paraná, Rio Grande do
Sul, Santa Catarina) where SINE has its largest number of offices.  In some
parts of the country, the SINEs have the reputation of being very politicized and
much of the private sector does not register their available jobs with them.  The
benefit-only focus to the UI system is reinforced by the ability of workers to use
the state banks (the caixas) to register for UI and receive their checks.  Without
any requisites for job-hunting, a number of interviewees sensed that many
workers, particularly younger ones, were waiting out the period of UI benefits
before looking for work.
36
There is an even weaker connection between unemployment benefits and
retraining programs.  This is a particular shame in the case of Brazil as it has a
wide variety of high-quality worker training that could be utilized more
effectively to reskill the unemployed, and, with better labor market
intermediation, channel them into new jobs.  The disadvantages of the current
poor linkage of UI with training and job placement are being recognized;
currently there are two pilot programs, in Brasilia and Rio, which are testing
ways to better link UI with initiatives in training and new job creation.  Any
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36Ivan Gonçalves Ribeiro Guimaraes, interview, May 14, 1998.- 36 -
future integration of UI benefits with either training, job placement, or new job
creation will be made more difficult by the multi-agency administrative
structure in which the program operates.
•  Centralized and Multi-Administrative Structure.  The system was conceived
of as a centralized program, yet because of Brazil's size and regional diversity,
there result quite different regional demands and an uneven quality of
implementation and service based on varying local capacity.  In terms of size of
the labor force, the Brazilian system compares, for example, with the United
States, which runs state-level programs under federal guidelines.  As explained,
Brazilian UI beneficiaries can register at one of three different local offices
(SINE, CEF, and Labor ministry), which have different regional quality and
representation. Almost by definition and certainly in practice, this means the
beneficiary can receive varying levels of quality of service.   The number of
SINE-national employment service, CEF, and Labor Ministry offices, for
example are within a similar range nationally
37, but at the regional level their
distribution varies more markedly.  There are 300 SINE offices in the South
(Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul) where only 18% of UI
recipients are located, while only 139 offices in the Southeast (Sao Paulo, Rio,
Minas Gerais) where 57% of the UI beneficiaries live.
38  This multi-agency
structure contributes as well to a varying range of services and type of staff
serving the unemployed.  In a study of the system, Paulo Chahad points out as
well additional administrative problems and notes that many local offices are in
precarious physical condition with poorly trained staff.
39
•  Dual Termination Payments.  In addition to unemployment insurance,
workers who are laid off in Brazil receive a form of severance pay from the
Fundo de Garantiado Tempos do Servicio (FGTS).  The Fundo works like a
series of individual workers savings accounts.
40  A portion of a workers' wages
are placed each year in an individual account and earn interest.  The worker can
monitor the amount accumulating in their account.  Upon termination, the
worker receives the balance of this account, and if the firing was unjustified, the
employer must pay a 40% penalty on top of this.  The FTGS is a benefit whose
origins stretch back to 1967 when, in return for giving up the guarantee of
permanent employment, worker savings accounts were created.
41 Today if a
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40A number of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have similar type funds.  See Economic
and Social Progress in Latin America: 1996  (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1996), 189-
197).
 41Capital from the FTGS has been invested in housing and sanitation projects, and, with different governmental
policies and hyperinflation has accumulated significant financial problems.  Beatriz Azeredo da Silva, Políticas
Públicas de Emprego no Brasil: A Experiência Recente, dissertation presented to the Federal University of Rio
de Janeiro, 1997, 305- 37 -
worker has been working just a few years, it is likely that his/her FTGS account
will exceed any UI benefit.  Since Brazilian UI is largely a cash benefit program
with only limited ties to efforts at job placement and connections to retraining,
questions arise, as in many other programs, as to what specific role
unemployment insurance is supposed to play.  Sorting out the objectives of UI
and other termination benefits is discussed, more broadly, in the concluding
chapter.
•  Potential Distorting Effect of Informal Sector.  Even in the initial years of the
UI program, the informal sector was already a significant factor in the Brazilian
labor market.  Estimates on the size of the informal sector see a growth from
approximately 45% of the labor force in 1988 to 57% today (1998). As in the
case of Argentina, interviewees across all three sectors -- business, labor, and
government -- felt that the existence of this large, informal sector and a UI
program for the formal sector interacted in a negative way.  Since Brazilian UI
is relatively short-term (three-five months) it would only provide an equally
short-term income supplement for moving from formal to informal work.  More
fundamental was the perspective of program administrators in Brazil, one of
whom felt that it was becoming very difficult to place older, unemployed
workers (more than 33 years old) in formal sector work.  Ivan Gonçalves
Ribeiro Guimaraes, who runs the state employment and job service in Brasilia,
says only about 2-3% of those receiving UI in this age group are able to go back
to formal sector work.
42  These trends toward increasing informality are
influenced by broader labor market factors (e.g., cost to hire or fire workers in
formal jobs, ability to evade labor laws), but it appears that UI can play a
reinforcing role in these trends.  This is distinct from a more classical economic
approach which argues that the existence of UI provides an incentive to workers
to seek formal sector work.
 D.  GERMANY
1.  Origins of the System
Germany has one of the longest histories of social legislation mirroring the wave of
industrialization in the early 20th century.  Despite being the first country to establish
social insurance (1889), Germany was relatively late in Europe to establish unemployment
insurance.  As a German government publication describes it: "Before 1914 the opinion
prevailed that anyone failing to find work only had himself to blame."
43  As a consequence
of the First World War, though, a system of state unemployment welfare was introduced
for those displaced by the war and of economic need.  This evolved into a broader program
of unemployment insurance in 1923-24 for those affected by economic circumstances and
was formally institutionalized into an independent institution, the Reichsanstalt for Job
Placement and Unemployment, with employer and employee participation in the German
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law of 1927.  Important in the German case is the early integration of job placement and
unemployment insurance benefits in one system with one institutional administration.  The
system provided up to 26 weeks of benefits with contribution rates varied for different
wage classes.  Coverage was nearly universal.
Before significant reserves could be built up, Germany faced massive unemployment
stemming from the global depression of 1929-32.  Unlike the British, who tried to
incorporate most of the unemployed under UI and ran into massive deficits, the Germans
progressively restricted their unemployment insurance system and changed it more and
more into a relief (welfare) type system.
44 Contribution rates were sharply increased,
waiting periods were extended, benefit levels cuts, and eligibility tightened.  Further
changes were instituted beginning in November of 1929, all aimed at keeping the
insurance scheme solvent.  The proportion of unemployed covered by UI peaked at 80% in
January 1929 and fell to 30% by January 1932, with the largest decreases likely
attributable to those who had exhausted their benefits.
45  Administratively, under Hitler's
National-Socialist regime, the Reichsanstalt lost all its independence and was heavily
politicized.
Slowly following the end of WWII, Germany moved to create again an independent
institution, now called the Bundesandstalt, with equal employer and worker participation,
which was charged with carrying out unemployment insurance, public job placement and
vocational guidance.  The program's structure, based on a 1969 law, is similar to that of
1927.  Administratively, the system has undergone further evolution and today the
Bundesandstalt für Arbeit handles UI, vocational guidance, job counseling and placement,
and promotion of vocational training.  The following chapter, which considers UI and
training, discusses further the German case with respect to training.
2.  Program Characteristics: Benefit Levels, Eligibility, and Analysis of Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  To be eligible for unemployment benefits a worker must have been in
insurable employment (e.g., formal sector work paying into the social security system) for
at least 12 months of the last three years.  Workers are eligible if their employment was
part-time, but it must have been for a minimum of 18 hours/week.  Exempt from making
insurance contributions, and thus exempt from receiving unemployment insurance are civil
servants, students, and those on disability pay.
Once unemployment benefits expire, workers are eligible for unemployment assistance at
slightly lower benefit levels but with a stronger means test insuring that workers do not
have access to other income (e.g., spousal earnings or investment assets).
If a person becomes unemployed due to their own behavior or even gross negligence
without good reason, they are still eligible for assistance but are disqualified for benefits
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for 12 weeks.  They can be disqualified for 8 weeks if they refuse to accept offered,
suitable employment or a place in vocational training or retraining.  These periods can be
reduced in cases of particular hardship.
Benefit Levels.  Workers receive 67% of their former salary in unemployment benefits,
60% if they have no children, for a period from 12 months to 32 months depending on
their age.  Workers under the age of 42 receive the minimum 12 months for at least two
years of previous work.  This increases to 18 months of benefits for those over 42 (at least
three years of work experience); 22 months over 44 years of age; 26 months over 49; and
32 months for those over 54 who have been employed at least 5 years and four months.
Unemployment assistance which can follow the expiration of unemployment benefits is at
10% lower benefit levels: 57% of the workers' former salary, 50% if the worker has no
children. There are a series of additional benefits for seasonal workers, particularly those
in the building trades.  For the building trades, workers can receive additional bad-weather
and winter allowances to smooth out the temporary losses of income.
There is also short-term assistance for workers who are temporarily laid off due to a work
shortage but will be returning to the same job.  This could be due to a temporary or
seasonal downturn of work or corporate restructuring.  The short-term assistance is paid
for up to six months.  The company or employer must report the temporary work stoppage
to the employment office and it is they who would make the payment of the short-term
assistance.
3.  Financing
Employers and employees pay into insurance funds at a 3.15% rate on wages taxable to a
specified ceiling.  The rate was raised in the early 1990s.  Employers, though, pay the
worker share of contributions for employees earning less than 10% of the ceiling.
Unemployment assistance is financed by government funds.  Figure 4 provides a summary
of German expenditures for UI from 1980 – 1995, showing a significant rise in demand in
the mid-1990s.- 40 -
Figure 4
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4.  Administration
Program administration is relatively autonomous and conducted by the Bundesandstalt für
Arbeit, whose main office is in Nuremberg, with offices throughout the country.  The
Bundesandstalt für Arbeit administers UI as well as gives vocational guidance, job
counseling and placement services, and promotes vocational training.
Once unemployed, workers must report in person to the local employment office in the
district in which they reside to register for benefits and insure they meet eligibility criteria.
Unemployment benefits are then transferred by accounts: a beneficiary does not need to
report regularly to the benefits office.
5.   Key Observations: Germany
•  Integration of UI, Job Placement, Training, and Employment Creation
Functions.  From nearly its inception, the 1920s, the German system has sought
to connect its UI program with training and job placement functions in a single
executing institution.   Its social program contains a relatively diverse range of- 41 -
instruments which permit the combination of UI with training, UI benefits or
assistance with a job creation measure (e.g., a wage subsidy to employers), and
training/retraining with a part-time job subsidy.  Due to the high cost of this
combination of benefits, special regulations were created when East Germany
was integrated into the West, which limit the job creation subsidies to those
unemployed who are the most difficult to place.
•  Combined UI to Social Welfare Assistance.   The German system provides
unemployment benefits to unemployed workers who pay into the system on a
contributory basis.  Once these benefits are exhausted, a worker may still be
eligible for a lower, but longer-term unemployment assistance, which is more
akin to a welfare system.  The German system provides benefits, thus, of nearly
an infinite duration.   This open length of benefit eligibility would be hard to
maintain in a developing country economy.
 E.  JAPAN
1.  Origins and Overview of Insurance/Services System
Unemployment insurance in Japan was first introduced following the end of the Second
World War.  There was a system of general unemployment insurance and a separate
program for temporary day workers which each exist today.  The Japanese unemployment
insurance system itself remained financially sound as the country underwent dramatic
shifts in employment and unemployment in converting to a modernized, peacetime
economy.  The program often ran in surplus and employer/employee contribution rates
were lowered on a number of occasions.  Demands on Japanese unemployment insurance
were constrained by two major factors.  First, the bulk of the insured population in Japan
were salaried workers in large firms who did not draw heavily on UI due to traditions of
"lifetime employment" and retraining and reemployment within firms.  Second, only 60%
of the workforce were insured; the more marginal workers were not in stable, insurable
occupations.
46
The most significant changes to the program came in 1974-75 in the wake of oil price shocks
which led to an employment crisis as well.  The changes expanded and refined benefits in a
number of ways and introduced three specific programs or services to help prevent
unemployment and improve working conditions.  These services, coupled with the provision
of integrated job placement services to all UI recipients, help define the Japanese approach to
what they term "employment insurance" rather than unemployment insurance.  These
employment-related services and training within the framework of an unemployment
insurance program are discussed further in Chapter III.  The description in this chapter is
oriented specifically towards the unemployment insurance benefit itself.  Briefly, employers
in Japan pay an additional 3% to cover the costs of the following three employment services:
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1.  Employment Stabilization.  Employers can receive a subsidy up to 100% for
a variety of initiatives to stabilize employment.  For example, employers can
be paid to hold open a position while the occupant goes on training or is
transferred to another facility during a reduction in business activity or
changes in industrial structure.  Stabilization measures also include subsidies
for the wages of older (61+) workers, regional incentives (in areas designated
for employment expansion), or family care leave.  The grants or subsidies
cover the employee's wages and temporary leave allowances.  This is the most
widely used of the three services.
2.  Assistance for Developing Worker Capacities in Business Restructuring.
Employers who are restructuring their business operations to provide more
stable employment in the medium to long-term can receive subsidies for a
number of initiatives: for education and training of workers assigned to new
posts; vocational training undertaken by small and medium-sized businesses;
assistance for skill evaluation; and, for setup and maintenance of facilities and
equipment for reassigned personnel.
3.  Services to Improve Worker Welfare.  This is principally for programs to
improve the workplace for health, safety, and environmental reasons.
2.  Program Characteristics: Benefit Levels, Eligibility, and Analysis of Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  The program is open to all insured workers who have paid into the system for
at least six months out of the last year.  Domestic workers, students, directors and officers
of corporations, and those working less than 20 hours per week are not covered.  Certain
sectors can join the insurance scheme on a voluntary basis -- agriculture, fishing, and
forestry -- and thus coverage in these sectors is variable.  There are separate eligibility
criteria for "specially insured" categories (as opposed to the regularly insured) such as
short-term workers (e.g., construction) and day laborers. As in Germany and Barbados, a
worker can receive UI if they have quit or lost their jobs due to their own actions but they
are subject to an initial waiting period before receiving any benefits.  Workers can still
receive UI while in training programs.
Benefit Levels.  The length and amount of benefits varies proportionately to a worker’s
age and length of service, providing substantially longer benefits at greater amounts for
older, more experienced workers.  For regularly insured workers, they can receive from
60-80% of their former salary within limits established for their age group.  For example,
the upper limit for daily basic benefits is 8,830 yen for those 29 and under, while it is 18%
higher for those in the 45-59 age category, 10,790 yen.  Benefits decrease somewhat
between ages 60 to 64, where other programs supplement income until retirement at age
65.- 43 -
Japanese benefits are of relatively shorter duration compared to other OECD countries,
particularly Europe. The duration of benefits varies from 90 days (for those younger than
30 with less than a year in their current employment) to 300 days for those age 45 and
older with over 20 years of experience.  A 45-year old worker receives 180 days of UI if
their period of employment is from five to nine years. The Japanese system has an
important feature called a re-employment bonus.  This is paid to workers who are re-
employed with up to one-third of their eligible benefit period remaining.  For workers who
are eligible for the full 300 days of benefits, if they are re-employed within 100 days, they
receive an additional lump sum of 120 days of benefits.
47  The bonus can range from 30 to
120 days of benefit.  The intention of the re-employment allowance is to provide an
additional incentive for workers to become re-employed more quickly.  Figures for 1995
show about 40% of UI recipients receiving some form of re-employment bonus.
Analysis of Beneficiaries.  Japanese UI recipients are relatively evenly distributed among
age categories.  As shown in Figure 5, 18% were under 30 years of age, 18% from 30-44
years of age, 23% from 45-59 years of age, and 20% over 60 years old for the financial
year of 1995.  Considering the reduced level of benefits for younger workers, participation
of youth is relatively high.
Figure 6 shows the industry classification of those who received benefits in 1995.  They
show that the predominant users of the UI system are workers in the manufacturing and
services sectors.  Remember again, that these workers are primarily in the small and
medium-sized industries.
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Figure 5
JAPAN: UI BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP
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3.  Financing
The Japanese UI system is a mixed system financed by both employer and employee
contributions and a smaller amount of government tax revenues.  Costs for unemployment
insurance are paid equally by employers and employees; but employers pay solely for the
three employment service programs. The combined rates for employers/employees vary
somewhat per sector: 1.15% of wages for general establishments, 1.35% for farming,
forestry, fisheries, and breweries, and 1.45% for construction.  These figures include the
.35% supplemental for the employment services, so for example, employers of general
establishments each pays .75% and employees .4% of wages.
Table 2.8
JAPAN: UI BUDGET 1991-97
( in billions of yen)
Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total Revenue 20,514 19,254 18,187 17,797 18,593 18,413 19,462
Employer/ee Contribution 15,662 13,713 12,266 12,270 12,457 12,650 13,104
Government 2,492 2,614 2,810 2,672 3,374 3,273 4,202
UI Expenditures 11,514 13,475 16,126 17,996 20,221 21,358 23,011
Surplus or Deficit 9,000 5,779 2,061 (199) (1,628) (2,945) (3,549)
Source: Ministry of Labor, Japan
The Japanese government contributes specific proportions to specific UI programs,
typically in the one-third to one-quarter of total expenses range.   Table 2.8, for example,- 45 -
shows for 1997 UI expenditures, employer/employee contributions constituted two-thirds
of revenues to the government's one-third.
4.  Administration
Once unemployed, the candidate reports in person to a local Public Employment Security
(PES) Office where they must submit the required separation form and make applications
for jobs and UI.  There are over 600 PES offices in the country.  The Employment Security
Bureau under the Ministry of Labor is in charge of the planning and implementation of all
aspects of employment policy except for vocational training, which is under the Human
Resources Development Bureau of the Labor Ministry.  The majority of the staff of the
Labor Ministry (15,284 out of 24, 897) work in the front-line offices dealing with the
public.
48
5.  Key Observations: Japan
•  System Reflects Particular Japanese Context That Is Now Changing.
The relatively "good fit" to date of the Japanese unemployment insurance
program to the Japanese macroeconomic context and industrial structure reflects
at least three characteristics distinctive to Japan that have kept demand for the
program relatively constrained and manageable.  One, demand in terms of
number of users has been largely concentrated in small and medium-sized
firms.  Owing to Japanese traditions, larger firms have tended to reemploy
workers within the firm under conditions of lifetime employment.  To put it
bluntly, large firms in Japan have been willing to subsidize
employment/unemployment programs for smaller firms for social and economic
reasons.  Two, official unemployment levels have been traditionally low in
Japan, and within that the UI system finances only roughly 40% of the officially
unemployed over the last few years.
49   The percent of unemployed covered by
UI is shown in Figure 7.  Those excluded encompass those who do not qualify
for UI as well as those who don't wish to accept it; the stigma attached to
unemployment is relatively strong in Japan.  Three, the employment services
financed under the Japanese program also constrain the number of people
seeking or needing unemployment insurance, although it is not known by how
much.
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•  The economic, social and cultural conditions that have kept the Japanese UI
program relatively solvent and contained since its inception, though, may be
shifting.  Official unemployment, after decades of low levels, is on the rise.
Previously only small firms laid off workers, but now every type of firm is
doing so.  Japanese firms are using contingent workers more along the U.S.
model.  Job service centers in Japan are becoming inundated with workers.
50
The program, as shown in Table 2.8, has begun to run a small annual deficit
since 1994.  Under conditions of increasing loss of profit margins and the
impact of the Asian financial crisis, it will likely be harder for large Japanese
firms to either continue paying the employment tax or not to make great
demands on it themselves.  What may be more instructive in the Latin
American and Caribbean context is less the special inter-firm relationship and
macroeconomic context under which the program has functioned, but rather the
emphasis on employment and training in the context of UI and special program
features like the re-employment bonus.
•  System Incorporates Employment Initiatives and Training Support with
UI. The Japanese system actively incorporates employment initiatives and job-
finding/placement into its unemployment insurance system, first by funding
alternative activities or "services" within the insurance system, and second, by
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Figure 7
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trying to integrate training, job placement and UI on-site through the public
employment service.
While the employment services generally represent only one-quarter of the
expenditures for UI,
51 their purpose is targeted to preventing further
unemployment, for example, through retraining workers or seconding workers
to another firm temporarily.  The combination of specific subsidies for
retraining under the employment initiatives plus other training initiatives for the
unemployed permits a fair amount of opportunity to get workers into training.
UI recipients can receive job placement and training referral services within the
public employment service system.  Without field research, it is beyond the
scope of this study to assess how effective both the smaller employment
services and the integrated system are. Anecdotal information, for example,
indicates that some Japanese feel the work centers do not offer a wide enough
array of job opportunities.  In principle, though, they represent a more
comprehensive approach to delivering unemployment insurance while practical
application requires a separate investigation.
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 F.  POLAND
1.  Origins of the System/Eastern European Context
In the early 1990s, as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) underwent
dramatic, and often radical transitions from state to market-led economies, unemployment
insurance was frequently initiated to protect incomes and lessen the shock of impending
unemployment.  The path taken and recommended for many Eastern European and FSU
countries was a relatively radical transition to a market economy, with a rapid transition to
competitive prices, reduction/elimination of production subsidies, and large scale layoffs
in state industry.
The fear of widescale unemployment from this transition was particularly great, as
unemployment had been both theoretically and socially inconceivable in the former
communist bloc.  Projected layoffs in Poland were very high, over one million new
unemployed within a year or two of market reform.  An unemployment insurance system
was designed not just as an emergency measure to facilitate the market transition but to be
integrated in the labor market policy of the country.  Polish officials perceived that the free
market economy would continually generate unemployment and a system was needed over
the long term.
In retrospect, many analysts are now beginning to question whether the Eastern European
transitions really needed to lay off workers on such a wide scale in order to stimulate
private sector growth.  Studies, instead, have found that the rate of new job creation and
the rate of layoffs in the state sector had no correlation.  Labor economists Richard
Jackman and Catalina Paean write:
The belief that unemployment is needed in the particular
circumstances of the transition, because it would facilitate the
movement of workers into growth sectors, seems to us
mistaken  -- private firms appear to recruit almost exclusively
from those with jobs in the state sector or new entrants to the
labor force rather than from the unemployed.
52
2.  Early Program Design
The original design of the Polish UI system in 1989 was open-ended with broad eligibility,
reflecting the deep apprehension and concern about the potential impact unemployment
would have.  Under the initial design, anyone who was without a job was eligible for
unemployment insurance and benefits could be continued indefinitely.  Thus, a worker
who had not been in the labor force before could still receive unemployment insurance.
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From 10-20% of the initial recipients, it was found, fit this category.  Benefit levels varied
with previous income or were set at a minimum level.
As the levels of unemployment exploded in the early 1990s this structure became untenable.
Demand for the program far outstripped administrative capacity and costs were escalating.  In
the 1991-92 period three important changes were made to restrict eligibility: a work test was
imposed (recipients had to have worked at least 180 days in the previous 12 months); an
eligibility period was defined (12 months); and, the benefits level was largely changed to one
flat rate, 36% of the minimum wage, for all recipients.  It is the changes in 1991-92 period
which largely constitute the current structure of benefits in the Polish system described
below.
3.  Financing
Polish unemployment and related benefits are financed out of a Labor Fund.  This fund has
two sources of income: a 2% employer payroll tax and transfers from the central
government budget.  It was originally conceived that payroll contributions would fund the
whole Labor Fund; this concept was soon abandoned, as contributions could not keep pace
with the huge increase in unemployment over a short period.  Government funds by far
became the principal financiers of unemployment insurance.  In 1990 and 91, government
financing accounted for 73% and 61%, respectively, of UI.
53  The Labor Fund, a concept
similar to the Fondo de Empleo in Argentina, also finances smaller programs for the
unemployed, training/retraining, assistance for self-employment, and subsidies for job
creation.  However, the vast majority of funds go to UI.
4.  Program Characteristics: Eligibility, Benefit Levels, and Analysis of Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  Workers must have worked at least 180 days in the previous 12 months.
School levers must wait three months before claiming benefits and then they can claim
only the remaining nine months of benefits.
Benefit Levels.  Under the original system, benefit levels varied according to previous
income with a floor of 95% of the minimum wage.  For the first three months, benefits
were paid at 70% of a recipient's former wage, 60% for the next six months, and 40%
thereafter.
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Table 2.9
POLAND: UI BENEFIT STRUCTURE
CATEGORY DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT (MONTHS)
4 6 12
New entrants 95% minimum wage (mw)
University 125%mw 95%mw School leavers
Others 110% mw 95% mw
Individual Lay-Off 35% average wage (aw)
New Entrants Training
Others 125% mw Eligibility exhausted
41.1% mw Eligibility exhausted
Source: Poland: Income Support and the Social Safety Net during the Transition, The World Bank, 1993,25.
With changes in 1991 and 1992, the Polish system moved to a flat rate of benefits -- 36%
of the average wage for the previous quarter with an additional 15% if the recipient is in
training.  Workers are eligible for up to 12 months of benefits.  The only exceptions are for
workers close to retirement and in some regions of high unemployment.  For these
workers, the benefit period can be extended to 18 months. Table 2.9 shows the benefit levels
under the flat rate system with variability by class of recipient with additional benefits to
those in training.
By calculating the wage based on the previous quarter, so-called "backward indexation,"
real benefit levels were actually even lower as rising inflation continually eroded the real
value of benefits.  The flat-rate system uses a different calculation for school leavers, 75%
of the minimum wage, and shortens their eligibility to 9 months.  Originally, higher
benefits were granted to those near retirement with long-term job experience, but this
benefit category was eliminated in 1994 and had few users (around 20,000).
Beneficiaries.  As benefit levels are kept relatively low (36% of the average wage) and
income levels of workers under the former communist regime had less variability than for
other nations, the program is continued to be perceived as serving lower-income
populations.  The unemployed in general in Poland have very low levels of educational
attainment: 22% had only primary or lower education; 58% had less than secondary
education.
54  The largest group of unemployed are the young, 15-24 years old, constituting
around 40% of the unemployed pool.
55
5.  Administration
Unemployment insurance is administered by regional and local labor offices (LLO) that
were originally set up under the communist government to assist workers moving to jobs
in different parts of the country.  Each of the 49 voivodships (local areas) has a number of
local offices under it (335 in total).  The local offices have the most direct contact with UI
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beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries must register at these offices and their eligibility is determined
there.  Benefits are distributed in cash at these offices and recipients must report monthly
to receive their benefits.  The staffs at the offices are first supposed to find a suitable job or
training for the unemployed person, and then if not, register them for unemployment
benefits.  In practice, these offices are heavily understaffed and ill equipped for such
functions.  As the program began in 1990, only one office in the country had an old
computer and others did not even have calculators for calculating benefits.  Conditions
apparently have improved substantially since the first years of the program but, as one
analysis put it, "The unemployed have to queue in most of LLOs [local labor offices] in
order to register or get their benefits and have limited chances of being offered a job."
56
6.  Linkages with the Training and Placement System
Through the local labor offices an unemployed person can be connected with a
training/retraining program or offered a job listed in the employment service.  The labor
offices themselves offer training programs or the unemployed person can take a course
offered by a private contractor.  The labor office pays the full costs of training, which
typically varies from two weeks to six months but is on average 2.5 months.
57  The
unemployed person may also be eligible for subsidized work or a public works job.  All of
these programs are paid through the Labor Fund but are funded at much lower levels than
unemployment insurance.   Table 2.10 shows the breakdown in expenditures between UI
and early retirement (another passive labor market program) and active measures such as
the employment service, training programs, and subsidized employment.  As a percentage
of GDP they are both small, but UI consumes more than five times the resources of active
labor market programs.
7.  Key Observations: Poland
•  Lessons of Administration: Advantages of Flat Rate Benefits/Need for
reparation.  The administration of the Polish UI system was overwhelmed in a
short period with the huge influx of demand for benefits.  The case clearly
demonstrates the need to have developed systems and trained staff prior to
initiating a program.   In addition, the administration of the system was
improved as well by moving to a flat rate system.  Local administrators didn't
have to make case-by-case calculations of 60%, 40%, etc. percent of a worker's
former salary before distributing benefits; cash disbursements were greatly
speeded up.  It was also found that the flat rate system induced more males to
leave unemployment for regular work, although not females.
58  It is believed
that the males had more possibilities of job offers and higher reservation wages
than women did.  This is an interesting lesson for Latin American systems
which more typically provide benefits similarly at lower rates, near or at some
multiple of the minimum wage.  If a country is to provide a generally lower
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level of benefits (i.e., it is not seeking to replace former incomes), it is worth
considering whether the advantages of simpler administration of flat rate
benefits and potential inducements to re-enter the labor force outweigh the
preference to give some varied level of benefits to high former wage earners.
•  Informal Economy Effects.  The Polish economy has a significant amount of
informality, although not at the levels experienced in many Latin American
countries (closer to 20%-30%).  The informality as well is of a different type
than Latin America in that bartering for goods is common as well as home
production.  Workers may engage in a mixed form of commerce, some
informal, some formal.  One survey found that 46% of unemployed people had
some form of work, generally only part-time or casual; another found that 35%
of employers were hiring people informally who were registered as
unemployed.
59  It is perceived that the program is helping to reinforce lower
incomes in the informal sector and contribute to the informal sector's growth.
•  Ease of Eligibility Initially Increased Unemployment.  Polish officials soon
realized that their initial design with unlimited benefits, no prior work
experience needed, and free health care actually induced people not actively
engaged in the labor force to register as unemployed.  An OECD study
concludes:
Poland can serve as an example where the existing
structure of incentives combined with a poor
performance of the monitoring system allowed
unemployment to rise substantially above the level
required to facilitate the necessary reallocation of
labour during transition.
60
In Poland, it was the combination of generous eligibility plus lax enforcement
which provided a significant inducement to registered unemployment.
Researchers in this study found that, in contrast, the Czech Republic case
demonstrates that the rapid rise in unemployment can be controlled through a
better institutional and regulatory framework.
61
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 G.  UNITED STATES
1.  Origins of the System
From the outset, the U.S. system was intended to permit broad flexibility to individual
states to set their own guidelines.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Committee on
Economic Security recommended that "States shall have broad freedom to set up the type
of unemployment compensation system they wish.  We believe that all matters in which
uniformity is not absolutely essential should be left to the States."
62  Despite the fact that
equivalent individuals may be eligible for UI in some states and not others and eligible for
different amounts of benefits, the emphasis on state-level programs has persisted in the
United States.  In 1966, for example, Congress considered imposing uniform benefit
standards, setting minimum levels of earnings for entitlement and bills were passed in each
house of Congress.  These versions were never reconciled and thus no change in law was
enacted.
As the UI program began, benefits were relatively short, particularly as the system's financial
viability was still in question.  By 1950, only 13 States had a maximum duration of 26 weeks;
by 1960, 42 States had this level of benefit or higher; and, by 1970, all states had reached this
minimum standard.  Beginning in 1958, the U.S. UI program has undergone specific
"temporary" expansion periods when longer-term benefits are permitted.  In the early 70s, a
permanent extended benefits program was enacted permitting extensions for an additional 13
weeks (up to 20 in some States), typically using a trigger for higher state level unemployment
rates.  As the United States underwent a deeper recession in the late 70s and early 80s, UI
benefits were extended further, again on a temporary basis.  The initial financing of extended
benefits have typically been split 50%state/50%federal, but further extensions have been
100% federally financed from either general revenue or the federal UI fund.
2.  Financing
The U.S. UI system is based on a self-financing principle, although general federal
revenues have been used to pay for specific extended benefits.  Currently, the U.S. system
is funded almost entirely by a payroll tax on employers; only four states have provisions
for worker payment through a small payroll tax.
Employers are taxed by both their resident state and, a smaller amount, by the federal
government which goes to the respective state and federal UI funds.  State funds are used
to pay out the bulk of UI benefits.  Federal UI taxes are built up to increase the balances
available for the federal share of extended benefits and to provide re-payable loans to
States with low balances.  Federal UI taxes also pay for administrative funding of the UI
program and 97% of the funding for the federal Employment Service offices that
administer UI.
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Experience Rating.  The U.S. system is unique in that, rather than a flat rate, it charges
employers a variable rate depending on how much unemployment they have generated, a
so-called "experience rating."  Employers who lay off few employees receive a discounted
contribution rate, while employers causing large layoffs pay a higher rate.
There are important trade-offs in developing an experience-rated system.  Some pool must
be reserved for shared risks: for example, bankrupt firms who no long pay into the system,
start-up firms which have not yet established a track record, or unemployment that is not
the fault of the employer.
63  The U.S. system allows each state to set the experience rating
for firms within the state; new firms are charged a standard rate until they establish a track
record.  There is great variability among the states in how they calculate experience, and
how much of the rate is experience rated.
Current index figures indicate that, on average, about 61% of state level benefits are paid
by the employers actually causing unemployment, and the rest is paid by shared risk.
64 The
index level for the nation has fluctuated in the 60% range since it was developed in 1988.
However, within this average, there is still a great deal of variability among the states.  For
example, in 1996, 86% of New York's UI benefits were paid by employers causing the
layoffs, while only 42% did so in Wyoming.
65
Maximum and minimum UI tax rates for employers can thus vary substantially by state.
For example, for the 1993 tax year, the minimum tax rate varied from 0% (in 7 states) to a
high of 2.5% in New York.  The maximum tax rate varied from 5.4% (in 13 states) to
10.5% in Pennsylvania.
66
The U.S. system was developed on the forward financing principle.  State and federal
surpluses are supposed to be built up during years of economic prosperity to pay for the
downturns that require greater UI disbursements.  There has, however, been great variability
over time in states' UI fund solvency, with some needing to borrow frequently from the
federal government to cover greater demands.  This has called into question the long-term
viability of the forward financing principle.
3.  Program Characteristics: Eligibility, Benefit Levels, and Analysis of Beneficiaries
Eligibility.  The basic requirement for all U.S. programs is that UI recipients be able to
work and available to accept and offer of work.  Beyond this, states are able to set a wide
range of eligibility conditions for their specific programs.  Workers must, though,
demonstrate significant prior workforce attachment; new entrants are not eligible.  The
self-employed are also not covered in the United States.  Typically, States tend to
disqualify individuals who leave jobs without good cause, carry out misconduct on the job,
or refuse suitable work.
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The Federal government does set a few additional guidelines which require states to deny
benefits to some or permit them for others.  Federal law, for example, requires workers in
approved training to receive benefits if they are otherwise qualified.  States are required to
deny benefits to teachers between terms and certain athletes between seasons.
Benefit Levels.  As with eligibility, benefit levels are determined at the state level.  All
States provide a maximum duration of 26 weeks during the 12 months following the filing
of the claim; two provide longer-term benefits.  This makes the United States a relatively
shorter-term benefit program in comparison with Western Europe, which typically exceeds
one year, often many more.   Even with that, the percentage of claimants exhausting their
full benefits has varied from the 1980s from 30-40%.
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A permanent program of extended benefits, required since the early 1970s by Federal law,
provides an additional 13 weeks of benefits and an option of a further seven weeks beyond
the 13.  Congress has provided even further extensions in periods of recession by special
supplemental legislation.
Benefits are not means-tested; they are available to any worker who qualifies.  Benefit
levels are intended to replace a given level of previous income, so the beneficiaries' former
salary is key to their level of benefits.  The majority of states replaced one-half or less of
pre-tax weekly earnings.  In 1997, the national average pre-tax wage replacement was
47%, with the national range spanning form 32.2% to 57.3%.
68  All states cap benefit
levels in some form.  The lowest State cap is $180 per week; the highest (without
dependents) is $390.  Thirteen states provide additional benefits if the recipient has
dependents; the highest dependency allowance would bring weekly benefits to $573.
Analysis of Beneficiaries.  In line with overall unemployment trends, the U.S. UI system
has increasingly served older, more professional workers, although the majority of
claimants make less than $25,000/year.  The average American UI recipient is a white
male earning less than $25,000/year.  From 1988 to 1997, the average age of UI claimants
rose from 38.2 to 40.1, following national trends in which the average age of job losers
rose.
69  The greatest age increase among the unemployment was for professionals whose
average age rose from 39.9 in 1988 to 42.1 in 1997.  The majority of recipients continue to
be male (56% in 1996), although female rates have been increasing.  Over two-thirds of UI
recipients (77% in 1996) made less than $25,000, and 48% earned below the poverty level
for a family of five.
70  Figure 8 demonstrates the current racial breakdown of recipients
who are predominately white.  Black and Hispanic recipients make up a little over one-
quarter of recipients.
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Figure 8
U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RECIPIENTS BY RACE
(1996)
Source: US Department of Labor
4.   Administration
Federal law requires that UI be paid through public employment offices or other such
offices approved by the Secretary of Labor.  At the same time, the UI system is becoming
increasingly automated.  In many states, workers need only report in person to make an
initial claim; thereafter they can mail in weekly claims or use a telephone voice response
unit.  This has been a more convenient process for workers, and in many instances was
motivated by cost savings, as states could no longer afford to keep many local offices
open.  Some states have even started taking initial claims over the phone, and others are
considering letting workers use the Internet to make claims.
Benefit administration itself is considered relatively responsive.  Timeliness of benefit
payment has gone down considerably over the life of the program.  While in the early
1970s, between 75%-85% of payments were made within 14-21 days, currently that figure
is over 90%.
71  Employer payments and record keeping is also being simplified and better
automated with new methods being tested as of 1995 to integrate federal reporting and tax
requirements of all federal agencies (e.g., Treasury, Labor-UI, Social Security).
A key problem related to administration of the U.S. system is in the funding.  In principle, the
federal government is to provide funds to the states for the administration of the UI system.
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In practice, through complicated budget regulations, UI administration funds actually
compete with other discretionary budget programs for funds and savings from UI
administration are not necessarily turned back to the UI program.  States also complain about
the formulas used to calculate how much administrative money each State receives, with
different adjustments made for case load and cost of living. To date, there has been no
agreement between Federal and state officials on how to change allocation for administrative
expenses.  Change to current formulas is no easy task, as many states oppose changes that
would decrease the funding for their program administration.  In sum, it is harder under the
vagaries of the U.S. system to equitably equilibrate administration costs to actual costs and
this can provide unequal incentives for administrative savings and reform.
5.  Key Observations: United States
•  Diverging Trends in Integrating UI and Re-Employment Services.  In
principle, the U.S. system seeks to facilitate the transition of workers into new
employment by connecting UI recipients with reemployment services (national
employment service, job banks, job-finding services, and training). The national
data bank, America's Job Bank, and the national resume service, America's
Talent Bank, use Internet services to provide job finding and search services on-
line.  Simultaneous, there has been a trend to increase automation of the system
and reduce the need for expensive physical office space.  In some states,
workers can apply by phone and never need to visit a caseworker or office.
Concern has been raised that these two trends are running counter to each other
and that, as automation increases, it will be harder and harder to link
reemployment and training services.  This is particularly true for the hard-to-
reemploy. This could be reinforced as well by the continued perception that the
national employment service is not widely used by the private sector and thus
represents only a narrow segment of available employment.  The effects of such
automation on service delivery, cost, and system integration have not been fully
studied, but have been duly identified by the U.S. Secretary of Labor for future
investigation.
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•  Decreasing Coverage of the Unemployed.  The United States has been
successful in covering increasing percentages of wage and salary employment
under the UI program.  Coverage is near universal of the civilian workforce
with the exception of the self-employed and workers on small farms.
Nonetheless, while coverage has expanded, a greater proportion of the
unemployed do not collect unemployment insurance.  Figure 9 shows this
change over time in the percent on unemployment insurance of the total
unemployed. There are a multitude of explanations behind this trend; no single
one provides the full explanation.  One, federal and state policy changes have
restricted eligibility and benefits overtime and taxed benefits.  Two, there has
been a decline in employment in the manufacturing sectors typically drawing on
unemployment insurance.  Three, there has been a decline in the unionized
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workforce and rise in the number of self-employed and independent workers
who do not participate in UI.  Four, there have been population shifts out of the
industrial states to states with traditionally low UI claims.
•  Financial Solvency of Continued Concern.  The great variability in state-level
UI demands, in eligibility criteria and benefits, and differences in fiscal
administration contribute to very different conditions of financial soundness and
sustainability of state UI funds.  By default, rather than design, many state-level
systems are functioning more on a "pay-as-you-go" fashion, rather than as
intended by forward funding funds in prosperous years to save for lean ones.
Following the severe recession of the early 1980s, 33 States did not have
enough funds to pay UI benefits and had to take loans from the Federal
Government.  Figure 10 below shows the decline over time of state UI trust
funds as a percent of total wages.  The return to forward funding is a goal
advocated both in the Secretary of Labor's current dialogue and in the findings
of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation appointed by the
President.
73
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Figure 9
UNITED STATES: INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT AS A 









1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Source: U.S. Department of Labor
Year- 59 -
Figure 10  



















































•  State-Level Systems: Fits U.S. Context.  As noted above, the U.S. system, by
definition, permits a great deal of flexibility and variation at the state level, in
what it charges employers for UI, what benefits are received, and who is
eligible.  This approach fits appropriately the U.S. context in which state
administrative capacity is relatively strong and traditions for state management
of social benefits are long-standing.  This capacity and social tradition for state-
directed benefits, as well as tolerance for differing levels of benefits, may not fit
appropriately many other nations, Latin America and the Caribbean included.
The United States is one of very few nations which has a decentralized, state-UI
benefit system; the vast majority have uniform benefit and eligibility criteria
and are run by federal agencies.
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  III.  UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND THE FINANCING OF TRAINING
In the terminology of the field, unemployment insurance is considered a "passive" labor
market program in that it transfers income to a recipient without actively engaging them in
reemployment.  Early retirement programs, too, are considered passive labor market
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policies as there is no intention of workers returning to active employment.  Passive
policies are contrasted to so-called "active" labor market policies that more directly seek to
integrate workers into the marketplace.  The principal forms of active labor market
policies are: training and retraining, job search assistance, employment services,
employment subsidies, and measures for the disabled.  Active labor market policies are
exclusively for the unemployed.  Many policies seek to improve the skills match or
upgrade the productivity of workers who are already in jobs.
The table below (3.1) demonstrates the current balance between active and passive labor
market policies in a range of OECD nations as a percent of Gross Domestic Products
(GDP).  One can observe the large proportion of funding devoted to passive measures
relative to active measures.
As a separate subquestion of this study, the sponsors requested a brief inquiry into whether
countries were using revenues from passive unemployment insurance to fund training
programs.  Can and do countries use unemployment insurance to fund their national
training systems?  For this study not only were the seven cases studied reviewed, but also a
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1. Unemployment Compensation 1.44 2.49 3.33 0.70 1.77 1.05 0.26
2. Early Retirement for Labor
Market Reasons
0.36 0.05 NA NA 0.05 NA NA
Active Measures
3. Public Employment Service 0.16 0.21 0.35 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.06
4. Labor Market Training 0.36 0.36 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.04
5. Youth Training 0.24 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.03
6. Subsidized Employment 0.48 0.34 0.42 0.07 0.16 NA 0.01
7.Measures for the Disabled 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.47 0.01 0.02 0.03
Total
Passive Measures (1-2) 1.80 2.54 3.33 0.70 1.82 1.05 0.26
Active Measures (3-7) 1.32 1.26 1.54 0.91 0.31 0.42 0.17
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Data Bank
The question asked in this chapter is a very narrow one: the use of UI monies to fund
training on a significant scale.  By any account, if one examines the literature on the
financing of training, using unemployment revenues is rarely mentioned.  The vast
majority of training around the world is financed by: (1) direct government tax revenues
(or rebates); (2) contributions by employers; and, (3) fees/contributions by beneficiaries
(workers).  Most systems contain a mix of financing by all three parties in very different- 61 -
forms.  Unemployment insurance revenues come from either government taxes or
contributions of employers/employees, or again, a combination of these sources.  Thus,
rather than a distinct new area of financing, using unemployment insurance revenues to
finance training simply means redirecting government revenues or employer/ee
contributions from their intended purpose -- paying UI claims -- to a broader purpose.
 A.  Training and Unemployment Insurance
A review of current experience of the financing of national training systems through
unemployment insurance revenues yields a very simple answer.  It does not happen.  No
country surveyed uses UI revenues to directly and exclusively finance training on any
substantial scale.  There are many reasons for this.
First, training and UI have different cyclical funding demands and linking the two creates
greater instability in funding for both.  The financial demands on unemployment insurance
are very cyclical; training is more an investment function that is needed in a down cycle
but has a more fixed, long-term demand.  Depending on UI revenues to fund training
typically has meant that funds for training are cut back when unemployment is high.  This,
unfortunately, is just when training programs are likely to be the most desirable.  This is
precisely what happened in Poland even without formal linkage between UI and training.
As unemployment rose sharply in the early 1990s, the Polish government had to cut back
drastically on the funds from its Labor Fund going to training and other active labor
market policies in order to channel it into UI benefits.  The percentage share of
expenditures from the Labor fund going to active labor market policies declined from
32.1% in 1990 to 7% in 1991 and fell even further to 4.7% in 1992.
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Second, drawing training monies out of UI funds risks greater insolvency in the UI
program.  Countries typically want to maintain the solvency of their UI funds for the
periods when they really need them, so they often require the accounts to be kept separate.
Insolvency is of great concern because UI is a form of insurance that pays out frequently.
It is not, for example, like high end, flood or disaster insurance that can pay out
infrequently.  It is rare to see a case of the long-term accumulation of surpluses. Even with
separation of UI funds from other labor market initiatives, funding crises still result where
training monies are cut to pay for UI.
Third, if unemployment insurance generates significant surplus revenues it is likely
because the contribution rate is set too high relative to demand.   This was the case of
Barbados, discussed in Chapter II, which was one of the rare cases of a UI program
generating significant surplus revenue.  The Barbadian government significantly raised the
contribution rate quite dramatically to 5.5% (total) during the structural adjustment years
of the early 1990s,
76 left it at this higher level too long, then reduced it to a total of 3% and
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that was still too high for the demand for the program.  Graph 1 in Chapter II displays the
annual creation of net surpluses beginning in 1992.  The Barbadian government does not,
however, intend for its UI program to generate such large surpluses forever.  One problem
that results in setting contribution rates above anticipated demand is to undermine long-
term support within the business community.  More typically, countries would seek
multiple uses for a high contribution rate.  Below is described the "large pool" model
where a portion of the resources are devoted to UI, others to active labor market activities.
A fourth factor keeping training and UI apart is a bureaucratic one.  In some countries, the
agencies handling UI and training are distinct; they require different skills and a different
bureaucratic set-up.  UI is sometimes handled as a form of social insurance with a more
social-oriented agency, although in a number of countries it is affiliated with the Labor
Ministry.  Distinct from training, UI requires a system of local offices and accounting
procedures to handle weekly/monthly disbursements.
Finally, limited experience with utilizing UI revenues for the financing of training
indicates that combining the two programs may make it harder to direct training funds to
the most disadvantaged groups.  If UI monies come from paying employer and employee
contributors, then they have a right to expect that the training funds be returned to them.
This was what was found by the OECD in the case of Austria, which previously had
funded a small amount of training from the residual of UI contributions over benefits paid:
..the financing of programs through the UI system seems also to
have impeded the broadening of the spectrum of activities to
include disadvantaged marginal groups (who, as a rule, have not
been regular contributors to UI).
77
 B.  Models for Funding UI and Training
Although no country uses UI revenues to exclusively fund training on any substantial
scale, there were a number of systems noted in the research for this study which link, in
part, the financing of the two.  For the purposes of analysis, most systems can be
categorized as one of two types of models.  The first is the large pool model.  In these
cases, a larger contribution rate is assessed on business (and workers) and funds are pooled
into a fund or institute that finances a range of passive and active measures.  Germany is a
primary example of this model.  In such a case, there is typically not a specific
contribution rate destined just for UI.  There are variations of this model in which UI funds
are channeled into a larger pool, but one can still identify the UI revenue stream.
The second group of cases can be called the small pool model.  In these cases, a portion of
UI revenues goes to fund specific training initiatives related to unemployment.   These do
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not represent the bulk of training financed by the country, but rather a method of financing
a few discrete programs.
1.  Large Pool Model
In the large pool model, contributions destined for paying unemployment benefits are
pooled in a large pot that finances a range of active and passive training programs.  It is
not that UI "surpluses" are used for training; UI is considered part of an integrated mix.  In
Germany, the payroll tax on employers and employees funds an Institute (the Federal
Employment Institute), which uses the money to fund a host of programs including: UI,
unemployment assistance, and training.  The government makes up any deficit.  It should
be emphasized, though, that even in this case the German system relies heavily on
employer involvement and employer voluntary financing of training, particularly
apprenticeships.  So even in this case, the large pool does not encompass all.  The German
case, though, is still instructive in how UI and training funding interact in a large pool
model:
•  It shows that drawing training and UI monies from the same pot runs into fiscal
difficulties, particularly in economic downturns when so much money is needed
for UI; and,
•  That the mixing of the funds, also contributed to programmatic difficulties:
when surpluses were large in the 60s -70s this led to generous design of
programs, and time consuming changes in terms and conditions of programs.
A variation of the large pool model can be seen in the case of Argentina where UI funds
are pooled with other revenues, including financing from multilateral institutions in the
National Employment Fund, the Fondo de Empleo.  The National Employment Fund
finances the youth program (Programa Joven), infrastructure investments, and limited
employment subsidies.  UI is by far the biggest consumer of the fund, comprising just over
the majority of its expenditures.
78  In the Argentine case, though, the business contribution
to UI is fairly explicit.  The 1.5% tax on employers is considered the limit the business
sector will sustain and as the case study in Chapter II layed out efforts have been made
over time to adjust program eligibility to meet anticipated revenues from this contribution.
Thus, it cannot be argued that UI revenues are being utilized to fund active labor market
programs; these programs have different sources of financing.
One might argue that the large pool model has some parallels to the payroll training taxes in
many Latin American countries.  In the case of the payroll training tax, though, the fund pool
all goes to one state institution.  If the government chooses to fund additional programs, it
does so outside the training tax.
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2.  Small Pool Model
In contrast to the large pool model, the funds destined for unemployment insurance are
clearly demarcated for UI.  In the small pool model, a portion of these designated funds go
to fund specific training or other active labor market policies.  In the language of the field
this is called "developmental uses of UI."  This means that a portion of the UI funds are
directed to activities to reduce or ameliorate the effects of unemployment.
There are a number of different variations and cases in the small pool model.  The most
prominent case is Japan.  Austria and Canada used to use UI funds for some training but
have both recently changed their systems for different reasons.  One might even argue the
United States fits the small developmental uses model, since it funds exclusively its small
national employment service from UI monies.
While unemployment insurance does exist in Japan, it does not have the central role it
does in the OECD countries because of the importance of "lifetime employment," in-
company training, regional development, and other measures that keep formal sector
workers from the unemployment rolls.  Nonetheless, Japanese UI has a number of unusual
features and employs the "developmental uses of UI" in interesting ways.
The Japanese system is financed by a payroll tax on employers and employees (1.15% of
wages) which is supplemented by the government, sometimes to one-third the costs.  The
Japanese system is called "employment insurance" for an appropriate reason, because it uses
the extra financing to prevent unemployment, promote worker training, and correct "improper
employment situations."  Three services are funded from UI monies.  These services are
funded from an explicit levy just on employers.  These services are:
•  Stabilization of employment.  Programs to prevent unemployment in insured
workers, rectify improper employment situations, and increase employment
opportunities in firms.  Includes subsidies for employment development for
specific job applications and human resource capacity building within firms.
•  Services for Developing Workers' Abilities.  Includes establishment and
operation of workers' education and training facilities, assistance for workers'
receiving education and training, other training upgrades.
•  Services for Promoting Workers' Welfare.  Includes funds for improving
working environments, job finding assistance, and promoting worker welfare.
It is important to remember that these are relatively small initiatives, as Japanese firms,
then other government programs, provide the lion’s share of training done in the country.
Nonetheless, these initiatives have an intellectual consistency in the use of UI revenues
and provide an interesting case of a  "developmental uses" model.- 65 -
 C.  Conclusions on Financing UI and Training
This review has argued that the proposition that unemployment insurance revenues could
be used to finance training is not only unrealistic but also not in the best interests of stable
funding for either UI or training.  Supporting this argument is the fact that no UI system
surveyed attempts to fund all its training programs through surplus UI revenues.  Instead,
the chapter showed that there are broadly two groups of models in relating UI financing
with training.  One is the large group model in which UI funds are pooled with other funds
to finance both active and passive labor market programs.  The second group is the small
group model in which some UI funds are utilized for specific training initiatives or
employment initiatives related to unemployment.  But these are not the bulk of training or
active labor market policies conducted in the country.
It must be kept in mind that most OECD countries, with far greater resources than Latin
America and the Caribbean, are struggling with how to devote more resources to active
labor market policies and in doing so cut back benefits or control costs to fund the heavy
existing demands on their unemployment insurance systems.  This does not provide a
workable environment for financing training.  In the case of the large pool model, there are
risks during periods of high unemployment that training programs may need to be scaled
back.  In the small pool model, the expenditures for training out of UI funds are limited so
there is typically little such risk.  Broadly, though, current realities must be emphasized.
In contrast to one program financing the other, there has been a trend in OECD countries
that the rise in unemployment has increasingly "crowded out" resources for active labor
market policies in favor of unemployment benefits, rather than create conditions for ample
financing.
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  IV.  Lessons and Recommendations for Latin America and the Caribbean
Given the limited experience in Latin America and the Caribbean with unemployment
insurance systems, this study has sought to survey a broader range of experience in order
to draw potential lessons for countries in the region considering whether UI makes sense
for their nation.  The lessons drawn from this study constitute only a preliminary input into
an emerging national dialogue within each country on labor market policies.  Would
unemployment insurance be a useful instrument in a specific country in the region?   Does
it fit a country's national objectives, labor market characteristics and needs, and resource
constraints?
The experience surveyed in this study shows that unemployment insurance is in no way a
"one size fits all" program.  Unemployment insurance exhibits some basic, common
features across countries: it is largely a short-term income replacement program for the
unemployed of the formal sector who have demonstrated labor force attachment.  But
within this general framework, there is a notable diversity in terms of length/type of
                                                       
79Harmut Lehmann,  Active Labour Market Policies in the OECD and in Selected Transition Economies
(Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, August 1995), 2.- 66 -
benefits, eligibility, design features, and national objectives.  This diversity is significant
enough that unemployment insurance can range from the largest labor market program run
by a country, as in most OECD countries (in dollar terms) or, in a smaller number of cases,
it can be a circumscribed program applying to a small segment of the workforce (e.g.,
Argentina) or single sector (e.g., construction in Argentina or artisan fishermen in Brazil).
Importantly, there is interest in the Latin American region in moving away from traditional
tax-based unemployment insurance programs to ones where workers accrue individual
savings accounts to use during unemployment.
This study reveals the need for a great deal of caution in broadly applying unemployment
insurance models to Latin America and the Caribbean.  First, because unemployment
insurance has a mixed record in many countries in terms of policy effectiveness and
financial viability.  Secure funding for UI has been a challenge and a number of countries
have run into funding crises just when demand is highest.  There is concern as well that UI
has not been used effectively to channel workers into new employment.  Many OECD
countries are struggling to reorient their labor policies away from reliance on primarily
"passive" labor market policies -- UI and early retirement programs -- in favor of more
active labor market policies -- job placement assistance, retraining and education, and
employment creation.  The Latin American and Caribbean region should not be quick to
embrace existing models which themselves are under scrutiny.
Second, caution is required in applying UI models to the region because there are a
number of traits of Latin American and Caribbean labor markets which would likely make
UI narrower in scope and effectiveness, depending on the labor market objective sought
for UI.  Through the case study research, it became clear that a number of Latin American
and Caribbean regional characteristics might distinctly affect the application of UI to the
region.  These regional characteristics include large informal sectors, high youth
unemployment and young working populations, and the existence of nationally-mandated
job termination benefits.
The conclusions of this study are presented in two parts.  Using the case study research,
the first part discusses specific regional traits and their relevance to unemployment
insurance, providing an initial screen to whether and what type of unemployment
insurance might be applicable to countries in the region.  The second section presents
broader conclusions and lessons learned about consideration of unemployment insurance
models in the region, by the type of objective sought, again drawing on the case study
research.
Broadly, the paper concludes that unemployment insurance in the Latin American and
Caribbean context is not universally applicable to the region. Rather, its application
depends on specific country labor market conditions and how these fit with the desired
purpose of unemployment insurance.  Is unemployment insurance to be intended for
macroeconomic stabilization, a labor market transition and restructuring tool, or a social
safety net for the poor?  The difference in objectives yields a very different answer in each
country about whether and what form of unemployment insurance is applicable.  This
chapter organizes its recommendations in terms of the potential objectives sought for UI:- 67 -
macroeconomic stabilization, social safety net, income replacement/labor force attachment
reward, labor market transition tool.
Overall, the study concludes that unemployment insurance is most applicable to the region
as a labor market transition tool, and least applicable as a wide social safety net or tool for
macroeconomic stabilization.  There are other policy instruments which are likely more
effective for the latter two goals.
80  Before these more generalized conclusions about how
UI might be applied in the Latin American and Caribbean context, there are a number of
factors regarding the region's labor market that are worth considering in both assessing and
tailoring a UI program to the Latin American context.
 A.  Labor Market Characteristics in Latin America and the Caribbean Important
to Assessing/Designing UI Systems: Lessons and Considerations
There are many factors which affect how unemployment insurance might interact in a
specific national labor market.  Would a large segment of the unemployed be ineligible for
assistance because they work in the informal sector?  Would unemployment insurance
benefits be significant enough given other termination benefits available?
This section reviews four important regional labor market characteristics which have come
out during the case study research of other systems.  This section discusses how these
characteristics might interact with unemployment insurance, affecting its impact and
utility.  In some instances, the paper suggests design features that can compensate for these
traits.  The four regional characteristics discussed are: high rates of informal sector
employment; high payroll and other labor taxes; existence of severance pay and other job
termination benefits; and large youth populations.  It must be emphasized that this is a
descriptive analysis as there has been simply little labor market research and survey work
done in the region on labor market traits relevant to UI.  It is important to stress as well
that these four characteristics, while common in the region, vary markedly between
countries and their relevance depends thus on the particular Latin American or Caribbean
nation.
1.  Large Informal Sector
In the vast majority of cases of unemployment insurance worldwide (e.g., OECD)
informality is not a predominant feature of the labor market.  Neither was it a feature of
the industrial economies which first developed and implemented UI.  Informality, or dual
labor markets (mixed informal and formal), have arisen predominantly in developing
economies, but not universally.  It is a predominant feature of Latin American labor
markets, but is much less prevalent in the Caribbean.
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But where informal sector is large in Latin America, it is quite large.  Informal sector
employment for the Latin America and Caribbean region as a whole is notably high and
has continued to grow, increasing on average from 51.6% in 1990 to 57.4% in 1996.
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Every Latin American country in the region has shown increased rates of informality, with
countries like Paraguay, Bolivia and Mexico showing urban informality rates over 60%.
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Logically, unemployment insurance is a system that applies only to the formal sector.
Informal sector work is not recorded; there are no consistent records about start and end
dates and salary levels.  There is no way to consistently and fairly document
unemployment and salary on the same basis for all workers for the informal sector.
83  Nor
is it easy to imagine how one could collect UI contributions in the way that they are
deducted from formal sector workers’ paychecks.  In light of these challenges, no UI
system in the world tries to incorporate informal sector workers and only a handful even
incorporate formal sector workers who are self-employed.
84
At first glance, though, it wouldn't seem to matter much whether UI applied just to the
formal sector.  As UI is typically "self-financed" -- contributions are paid for out of
contributions from formal sector workers and employers -- it constitutes a form of "self-
taxation."  Thus, it is up to the formal sector whether it wishes to insure itself against
unemployment and trends in one sector would not seem to necessarily affect the other.
The only direct inequity would come in the use of general government revenues to finance
UI, rather than taxation, as this might mean government revenues supporting formal sector
workers at the expense of alternatives for informal workers.
This section looks a little closer at what relevance a large informal sector might have to
achieving the objectives of and executing well an unemployment insurance program.  To
date, there has been limited study of the interactions of unemployment insurance in dual
labor markets, largely studies and surveys in Eastern Europe which have smaller informal
sectors than Latin America.  There has been no systematic study in Latin America among
the limited UI systems as to how they function in relation to the informal sector.  Short-
term field research conducted in Argentina and Brazil for this study and the experience of
Eastern Europe indicate a few potential implications from the introduction of UI into
economies with informal sectors, trends which may likely weaken the impact of
unemployment insurance for certain objectives and give perverse incentives to
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increase further the informal sector.  It must be stressed that these are only potential
implications; much more systematic study is needed and recommended by this study
before firmer conclusions can be drawn.  The implications fall into two generally
categories: how UI might affect the interaction and mix between the formal and informal
sectors; and, how a large informal sector affects which objectives of a UI program are
achievable.
a. Potential Interaction of UI in Informal/Formal Labor Mix
Following are some potential implications of the interaction of UI with informal
labor markets in the Latin American context:
•  Undermine Utility of UI: If a large proportion of workers receiving UI benefits
are also working on the side in the informal sector this undermines some of the
key rationales for providing workers with unemployment insurance benefits.
As it exists in the OECD countries, UI beneficiaries are to be available for work
and utilizing the time to find work roughly equivalent to their former skill and
income level.  Because workers are less available to look for work if engaged in
the informal sector, the transition to new employment may take longer or a
worker may simply continue to work in the informal sector once benefits expire,
likely at lower levels of remuneration.  UI for many workers then functions as a
"short-term salary supplement," rather than income support as a transition tool
to finding new, skill-appropriate work.  As well, a perverse penalty would be set
up: lose your UI benefits if you obtain formal sector work, keep them if you
work informally.  This disincentive is not necessarily decisive; there are many
more benefits to long-term work in the formal sector.  It might, though, provide
incentives for workers to prolong entry into the formal sector, undermining the
rationale for UI as a transition tool, and making it less likely that the worker
ever returns to formal sector work.
•  Reinforce Greater Informality: qualitative evidence indicates that with the
existence of UI, a segment of workers are entering into informal sector
arrangements -- sometimes with the employer who just laid them off -- and are
able to use UI as a cushion against the reduction of income and loss of benefits
from the transition from formal to informal work.  Without more intensive
survey research it is difficult to determine to what extent this is occurring in the
few UI systems in Latin America.  It is significant, though, that this short-term
cushion for informal sector employment was mentioned by all types of
participants in Brazil and Argentina in interviews for this study -- unions,
government administrators, and business leaders.  The incentive to undertake
informal sector work and collect UI benefits as well is reinforced in systems
where the level of UI benefits are kept near the minimum wage, as in many
developing countries.
It is important to stress that in economies with large informal sectors, there
already exists incentives for employers to hire informally given the cost savings- 70 -
and limited fear of detection/sanctions.  It is not known what further incentive
UI might add.  At a minimum, though, the existence of UI makes it easier for
employers to convert formal to informal sector jobs and convince workers to go
along with it.
•  Reinforce Job Insecurity in the Informal Sector As Formal Sector
Employment Becomes More Protected.  Job insecurity is very high and of
concern to workers throughout Latin America.  Countries with higher levels of
job insecurity are also the ones with greater informal sectors.
85  Unemployment
insurance has been viewed as one policy tool that would help reduce job
insecurity among workers in the region.  It is important to stress, however, that
enacting a UI system in countries with large informal sectors would not help
lessen insecurity in the larger informal sector.  Indeed, such insecurity would
likely worsen as the formal sector would become proportionately more safe and
secure.
b. UI Objectives Critical in Large Informal Sector Economies: Poor
Instrument for Social Safety Net
Beyond the implications for the interaction between UI and the informal
and formal sectors, the existence of a large pool of informal sector workers
in a Latin American or Caribbean country affects the national utility and
purpose of enacting a UI system.  Simply put, the existence of a large
pool of informal sector workers in a given country renders UI decidedly
less useful as a social safety net or macroeconomic stabilization
instrument.  UI could not be useful on a broad basis to stabilize incomes in
the economy when less than half of the working population was eligible for
assistance.  It would be unable to protect incomes at the lower end of the
scale when the vast majority of the poor would also be ineligible.
This does not mean UI should be abandoned as a policy option in countries
with large informal sectors.  Rather, countries would have to be much
more careful about which objective was sought by UI and tailor
program design accordingly.  Countries with large informal sectors
should understand that it will be impossible to insure that UI recipients
meet the criteria of available to work by being 100% unemployed.  It is
important to decide whether there is a national interest in still providing
some income protection to unemployed formal sector workers (labor
attachment reward objective) or facilitating the labor market transition of
formal sector workers (labor market transition objective).  Rather, it means
that UI is better used for the objective of a labor market transition tool for
formal sector workers. If so, countries should consider providing greater
job search requirements and assistance as way to reinforce the use of UI
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as a market transition tool, rather than reinforce supplementary work in the
informal sector.  A second consideration would be to means-test benefits
as a way not to reinforce informality at higher wage levels.  Finally,
countries in the region would benefit from greater study on the interaction
of UI and dual labor markets before major policy changes as suggested by
this study.
2.  Payroll and Other Labor Taxes
One of the factors contributing to the rise in informal labor markets in the region is the
avoidance of the payment of heavy taxes on labor.  Effective tax rates for labor vary
markedly across the region.  Costs of social security are lowest in the Caribbean while
highest in Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia and Brazil.
86  An estimate of the total cost of
labor benefits and social programs
87 among Mercosur countries finds a variance in total
costs from 102% of a workers' salary in Brazil, to 70% in Argentina, and 41% in
Paraguay.
88
High tax requirements on labor can provide a disincentive to hire labor over investing in
capital and may discourage investment in a high-tax country at the expense of a low-tax
one.  There has also been a strong positive link between high labor costs and increasing
informality.
89  This, of course, does not mean that taxes on labor are not important to
providing for basic social security and other labor market programs; it is the comparative
burden of taxation and how the funds are used that is most relevant.
In considering whether to impose additional taxes for contributions to a UI program, Latin
American and Caribbean countries with high effective labor taxes need to consider that UI
may need to be part of an overall restructuring and labor market reform.  OECD
nations largely had the advantage of creating UI systems at earlier stages with lower
effective tax rates or with greater ability to sustain higher effective rates.  Latin American
and Caribbean nations will need to be more creative in how they might incorporate UI
systems within their current labor market mix.  Perhaps a portion of current payroll
training taxes could be devoted to a UI system; or, as discussed below, a UI system
could be part of a reform of the gamut of severance and termination benefits.  This is not
to imply that key benefits must be reduced for labor, but rather that to incorporate a new
benefit in Latin America, other benefits may need to be better structured so as not to
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disadvantage labor by discouraging employment and feeding the growth of the informal
sector.
3.     Existence of Severance Pay and other Termination Benefits
A third factor that needs to be considered in proposing or designing UI systems for Latin
America is the extent of severance and other termination benefits already in place, the
objectives and amount of benefits, and the potential interaction with UI.  Here again, Latin
American and Caribbean labor market characteristics can vary with the OECD countries
where UI originated.  In many of the OECD countries, there were few nationally-mandated
termination benefits before UI was created.  In contrast, the Latin America and Caribbean
tradition has been to rely on nationally-mandated requirements rather than create specific
benefit programs or rely on collective bargaining mechanisms.
Most countries in the region require an employer to provide termination benefits to
workers fired without just cause.  This is meant to protect workers against arbitrary
dismissal as well as provide a penalty to employers who do so.  Countries vary as to how
substantial unjust dismissal benefits are, and importantly, whether economic circumstances
are defined as an "unjust cause".  In countries where economic or market changes are not a
reason to fire a worker, the requirement provides additional disincentives to restructuring.
Fewer countries in the region have legislated severance benefits.  Severance pay requires
employers to pay workers upon termination -- for any reason -- an amount prorated with
their years of service. In some countries in the region, severance pay can be quite
generous.  Colombia and Ecuador require as much as 25 months pay after 10 years or
more of seniority
90; Argentina provides one month for every year worked, with a
minimum of two months provided for a minimum of three months worked.
These types of benefits -- unjust termination and severance pay -- are intended to
discourage firings and reward employment stability.  Unemployment insurance has a
different function in that it is not aimed at changing the incentives of the firing decision,
but rather assisting the unemployed once terminated.  Even though they have different
objectives they can serve similar secondary purposes in providing income to workers once
terminated.  Depending on the labor market context, all three types of benefits can co-exist
in one country, but this may not be the best alternative.  For UI to be effective it must be
seen to be a reward for labor market attachment and aid a worker in cushioning the
transition to new employment, ideally utilizing their long-acquired skills.  Severance and
other termination benefits may be so substantial in some countries as to dwarf, and
make irrelevant, any UI program.   
It is important in Latin America and the Caribbean that unemployment insurance
programs be considered in the context of the entire mix of termination and severance
benefits.  The existence of termination benefits was not necessarily a factor in other
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countries that enacted unemployment insurance.  In the United States, for example,
severance pay agreements are made through collective bargaining agreements; there are no
national standards or requirements.  When UI was enacted in the United States following
the Depression, it was seen as the only support mechanism for a large portion of the labor
force.  In a certain way, one could argue that many of the severance and termination
benefits legislated in the developing world needed to compensate for the absence of any
other form of a social safety net like UI.  In Barbados, a UI system was enacted in 1982,
after a severance pay requirement had been on the books since 1967.  The Barbadian
legislature, in order to garner support for the new UI program, agreed to place a cap on the
maximum amount and number of years available for severance pay.
It is important to consider whether in Latin American and Caribbean countries enacting
unemployment insurance will not duplicate existing benefits, nor will UI be so minor
as to be irrelevant in employers or employees employment decisions.  Important
questions are: what percent of the unemployed received termination benefits, and how do
these benefits compare with proposed UI (i.e., could UI serve its function of replacing lost
income?) Is a new program of unemployment insurance needed or would workers be
equally served with a reform of severance packages?
4.   Youth Labor Market
A fourth and final factor in considering and designing unemployment insurance programs
in the region regards whether and how much to cover unemployed youths.  Depending on
how eligibility is defined and the level of youth unemployment in a particular nation, the
UI program could end up -- perhaps unintentionally -- principally serving very young
populations.  Many European systems allow youths to collect unemployment if they do not
find employment immediately after leaving school (typically at lower remuneration levels
than adults).  Other UI systems, such as in the United States, place a length of work
requirement of two years or more in a single establishment which effectively limits the
number of youths who are eligible; other programs are intended to cover the more
specialized problem of youth employment.  The concern over providing unemployment
insurance to youth who have not yet developed an initial labor force attachment is that it
can corrode the development of early workplace skills and undermine their attitudes to the
workplace.
For Latin American and Caribbean economies this can be a particular issue because of the
large cohort of young people among the population and high levels of youth
unemployment in many nations.  While there has been some aging over time of the
region's population, comparatively Latin America and the Caribbean is still the second
youngest region of the world with an average age of 27 years to Africa's 22 years.
91  There
is great variability within the region, with particularly young populations in Central
America and higher average age populations in the Southern Cone and parts of the
Caribbean.  Despite differences in the relative proportions of the youth populations, youth
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unemployment is typically high in the region.  For example, among 12 countries
throughout the region, urban unemployment rates were highest in every country for the 15-
24 age group.  This includes the highest rates of 31% in Panama, 24% in Uruguay, and
22% in Argentina, of which the latter two have relatively smaller youth populations.
92
The region has already begun experimenting with specific labor market programs targeted
to youth such as in Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela and pilot efforts in Panama and other
nations.  These youth programs aim at addressing specific barriers to youth entry into the
workplace through short-term internships and training.  This type of youth-specific
intervention address problems that unemployment insurance cannot, such as employer
attitudes, basic work skills and readiness training for youth.  In considering
unemployment insurance programs, Latin American and Caribbean nations should
examine closely their youth unemployment problem and make policy decisions about
whether and how much youth should be covered by UI, and/or whether youth
unemployment is better addressed with a more specific intervention.
Latin American and Caribbean countries with high youth unemployment rates need to give
consideration to the large number of young recipients that would result from more open
eligibility and more limited work requirements.  In Brazil, where recipients are eligible
after working only six months in the last three years, fully one-half of all UI recipients are
under 30 years of age, and more than one-quarter are under 24 years of age.
Latin American and Caribbean nations with high rates of youth unemployment should give
particular consideration to two key issues: (1) the eligibility and work requirement criteria
for UI and how broadly this would encompass youth populations; and, (2) whether the
application of UI to youth populations would best serve national labor market needs or
whether other forms of more active measures -- training and workforce development
programs would better address early new job entrants.
B.  Lessons and Conclusions for Latin America and the Caribbean in Implementing UI
Systems
There is no such thing as an ideal unemployment insurance system.  The record of
unemployment insurance is a mixed one: while providing important income replacement
for many laid-off workers, many programs have had significant fiscal difficulties and/or
been accused of being overly generous with benefits and have generally been less effective
as vehicles to get workers into new employment.  A key difficulty over time within OECD
countries has been that while unemployment insurance is designed to address temporary,
short-term unemployment it has overlapped and provided benefits to the growing
problem of the long-term unemployed.  The long-term unemployed have much greater
barriers to reentering the labor force.  Some programs have tried to compensate by
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permitting UI beneficiaries to receive retraining, but all told, UI is an inappropriate
instrument for addressing the larger problem of long-term unemployment.
Many OECD countries are striving to redress an imbalance they see between passive (UI)
vs. active labor market policies.  Passive policies have consumed the lion's share of
resources, but active measures, while their record is not totally proven, offer the prospect
of more directly retooling workers for a rapidly changing workplace.  Latin American
and Caribbean economies should not repeat OECD mistakes by rapidly installing
unemployment insurance systems at the expense of active labor market policies.
Nonetheless, unemployment insurance can be an important instrument for assisting and
facilitating workers through temporary periods of unemployment, in helping make labor
markets more flexible, if countries are careful to tailor the benefit system to their country
circumstances, labor market needs, and administrative capabilities.  In considering the
implementation of an unemployment insurance system, this study has revealed the need for
assessment in a number of areas: important pre-conditions for program success; consideration
of objectives sought and design adaptations for these objectives.
1.  Important pre-conditions for UI success
•  Short-term unemployment should be of particular concern.  In some
countries in the region, long-term unemployment and poverty far outweigh the
concerns of protecting against short-term unemployment which, as yet, does not
play a significant labor market role.  UI should be considered an important
policy tool when the issue of concern is dealing with short-term unemployment
flows.
•  Job creation should be sufficient to support worker transitions.  The
unstated assumption of an unemployment insurance program is that there is
sufficient job creation and mobility in the economy to handle the transition of
workers from one job to another; UI is just needed just to bridge that transition.
If job creation is extremely limited in a particular Latin American or Caribbean
nation, UI would have little chance of being effective.  It would merely serve as
a short-term income supplement.
•  Sufficient administrative capabilities needed.  If a large segment of the labor
force is to be potentially eligible, unemployment insurance requires an
extensive and efficient administrative structure.  It requires a network of
regional offices, mechanisms for transferring weekly or monthly substantial
sums, and the ability to verify income and eligibility.  An exception would be
for small economies that could do with just a few offices to serve the
population.  This administrative apparatus is not cheap, and depending on the
length and amount of benefits a Latin American/Caribbean country is willing to
provide there may be less costly alternatives.  In particular, a Latin American or
Caribbean country could choose to:- 76 -
a. develop a form of unemployment insurance that is in bulk
payments (1-3) that does not require an extensive administrative
apparatus.
b. use a flat-rate level of benefits.  Poland found an important ease in
administration by simplifying its system to one rate for all, eliminating
the need for income verification and clerk calculations.  This reflects,
though, the type of UI that provides a minimum social safety net
rather than substantial income replacement.
c. combine UI delivery within an existing service delivery network.
Argentina runs its unemployment insurance program through its social
security offices; Brazil uses a combination of its Labor Ministry
offices and state-supported banks.  While this is a logical response to
the administrative demands of the program, it has its trade-offs in
terms of linking workers to job search, training, and other services.
2.  Clarity of Objectives and Design Features to Achieve Objectives
Many UI systems in both developing and industrial countries were created in the
midst or in the wake of a major employment crisis.  This is often one of the more
difficult times to assess what role UI is to play in the long-term labor market mix
when the principal impulse is simply to protect against the current or another crisis.
Chapter I laid out four objectives typical of modern-day UI systems.  They are:
•  Social Safety Net;
•  Macroeconomic Stabilization
•  Promote Restructuring/Labor Market Efficiency; and
•  Income Replacement/Reward Labor Force Attachment.
.
One of the principal conclusions of this report is that clarifying the objective
sought by unemployment insurance and squaring this with the national context and
needs is the critical variable in deciding whether and what form of unemployment
insurance is appropriate for a given country in the region.  Below is summarized
the report's conclusions that the most applicable objectives to the region is utilizing
UI as a labor market transition tool.  The social safety net objective for UI, while it
is the more intuitively appealing objective given the region's high levels of poverty
are least applicable.
3.  Social Safety Net Objective: Less Applicable to the Region
On the surface, one might assume that Latin American and Caribbean countries
would tend towards utilizing UI as a social safety net for the unemployed poor.
The case study analysis of this report has revealed that UI systems, even in the- 77 -
absence of a large informal sector, tend to serve the middle-income range of
beneficiary, not the poorest.  With a little examination, this makes intuitive sense.
The poor have a more unstable employment profile and are less likely to have the
years of job tenure needed to qualify for UI.  This is much worse in economies
with large informal sectors as the poor are disportionately represented in this
sector. Lowering the requirements for length of time in employment, as was the
case in Brazil, still doesn't necessarily reach the poor.  By reducing work test
requirements, one also brings in a younger population and in those cases UI might
not be the best labor market instrument, as discussed above.
Other developing country systems, such as Poland, have reached the poor by
putting benefit levels so low (at one-third the minimum wage) that only lower
income levels are likely to participate.  But even this change might not be sufficient
for the region, where a large proportion of the poor are in the informal sector.  The
Argentine case, for example, showed that even as benefit levels were kept close to
the minimum wage to 1.5 times the minimum wage this did not prevent the average
income of beneficiaries from continuing to increase.  In recent data, only 6% of
beneficiaries in Argentina earned less than the minimum wage (300 pesos/month)
and more than 17% of recipients earned three times the minimum wage before UI,
over 1,000 pesos/month (Chart 2.3, Chapter II).  Higher income workers were
likely viewing UI more as a salary supplement than income replacement.
Latin American/Caribbean programs that have a greater interest in using UI
as a social safety net should seek programs that subject beneficiaries to a
means-test.  One way would be to bar recipients whose former incomes are above
a certain level from participating in UI.  For higher income workers, providing job
search assistance could be the primary form of assistance.
4.  Macroeconomic Stabilization Objective: Requires Specific Country
Circumstances and Program Design Features.
Using UI as a macroeconomic stabilization tool is becoming less relevant even to
industrial country economies.  Chapter II demonstrated, for example, that in both
the United States and Japan, UI is continuing to cover a smaller percentage of the
employed labor force.  This downward trend is largely because of the greater
diversity in part-time employment, self-employment, and other forms of non-
covered employment.  Further, study on the U.S. system has had a harder time
verifying, if indeed, UI has provided this stabilization function in the U.S.
economy.  It, has, for certain, provided an instrument for extended benefits during
economic downturns in the U.S. in key regions such as the Midwest.  One key
problem in using UI to meet macroeconomic stabilization goals is whether the
system is financially able to do this.  A number of countries, including the cases of
Argentina and Germany in this study, sought to cut benefit levels as demand
increased to prevent the UI program from exceeding fiscal constraints.- 78 -
The objective of macroeconomic stabilization should thus be subject to caution in
any country context, with serious study employed on the target population to be
reached in macroeconomic crisis and the country's labor market profile.  A system
would need to be designed that had sufficient reserves to cover a crisis period.  In
the Barbados case, the country substantially increased the unemployment insurance
tax on business during an economic crisis to cover greater UI claims.  The program
was able to meet stabilization needs but this action of raising rates, of course, has a
countercyclical economic effect.  The United States extends benefits only for
regions of higher unemployment.
For the Latin American and Caribbean region, this study recommends that
macroeconomic stabilization be carefully considered before being employed as the
objective of a UI program.  Consideration must be given to the financial ability of the
system to provide funding in an economic downturn.  For countries with large
informal sectors, this study argues that macroeconomic stabilization is an
inappropriate goal for a UI program as it would reach too small a percentage of the
population.
5.  Income Replacement/Labor Force Attachment Objective:   Achievable in
the Region but Requires Policy Decision
Providing workers with income following a layoff for those who have
demonstrated a significant attachment to the labor force is one of the most common
objectives of unemployment insurance systems worldwide.  The intention of UI
programs, as described in Chapter I, is typically to provide sufficient income so
that workers have time to seek new work at appropriate skill and income levels.
No UI system seeks to completely replace lost income.  Gross unemployment
benefits in the OECD countries typically range from 40-75% of average earnings;
most are capped at the higher income levels.  When taxes and other factors are
considered, net replacement rates are much lower and very variable among OECD
nations.  Net replacement rates vary from the high end of 81%




For developing countries, the fiscal burden of replacing large percentages of former
income must be considered.  It is important to note that of the developing economy
case studies in this study, only Barbados seeks to replace a percentage of lost income.
In the other cases -- Argentina, Brazil, and Poland -- benefit levels more typically are
calculated as a multiple of the minimum wage based on the worker’s former salary.
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For developing countries, maintenance of a minimum standard of income is a more
feasible policy goal.
6.  Labor Force Restructuring Objective: Most Applicable to the Region
Using unemployment insurance as a vehicle for transitioning workers from one job
to the next is not a typical, primary goal of UI as it exists in the industrial
economies, although many systems are moving in this direction.  To use UI as a
transition tool requires countries to design and implement "passive" unemployment
insurance as part of a package of active labor market measures delivered to the
unemployed.  This package could include job search assistance, placement, skills
assessment and training.  UI thus serves as an income supplement to encourage and
enable workers to effectively transition to new employment, helping reduce the
initial resistance to job change.
Latin American and Caribbean countries are continuing to undergo dramatic
changes in how their labor markets operate.  We see in the region greater volatility
in employment and greater numbers of job changes.  If we accept that UI is an
instrument only for the formal sector, facilitating labor market transitions might be
an appropriate goal for this segment of the labor force and one fitting growing
regional needs.
The real challenge to making UI more of a transition tool is how to do this in any
particular national context.  OECD nations are experimenting with incorporating
training and self-employment in UI delivery and linking UI with national job
placement programs.  As discussed in the UI case study, the United States is
grappling with the contradictory trends of linking UI better to training and
placement while at the same time trying to reduce administrative costs -- which has
encouraged the closing of regional offices and less human contact through
mail/phone systems for checking in with UI officers.  Latin American and
Caribbean countries would have an initial advantage in trying to create systems
from the start which sought to achieve job transition goals.  Such UI systems,
however, would require a number of key elements, including: efficient
administrative apparatus, support and participation of the private sector, and
diversified training systems.  This echoes previous recommendations that any UI
system in the region be conceptualized within the framework of an overall labor
market reform and restructuring to enable all the components to more successively
meet national labor market goals.ANNEX II
Interviews/Consultations Conducted For Study
Azeredo, Beatriz Directora da Area de Desenvolvimento Regional e Social do
BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Barr, Nicholas Economist, Eastern European Economies Specialist, London
School of Economics, London
Blackman, Colis General Secretary, Barbados Employers' Confederation,
Barbados
Bour, Juan Luis Economista, Fundación Investigaciones Económicas
Latinoamericanas (FIEL), Buenos Aires, Argentina
Bradshaw, Lloyd Acting Director, National Insurance Scheme (NIS), Barbados
Braitwaite, Kathleen     Ministry of Labor official, Barbados, 18 August 1998
Cavalieri, Armando      Sindicato de Empleados de Comercio, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Chaddad, José Paulo     Assessor Especial, Ministério do Trabalho, Gabinete do
Ministro, Brasília-D.F., Brazil
Correia, Alexandre Dpto. de Economia, Federçao das Indústrias do Estado de Sao
Paulo (FIESP), Sao Paulo, Brazil
Diaz, Ricardo Dario Ex-gerente, Programa de Seguro de Desempleo y Asignaciones
Familiares, Ministero de Trabajo, Gerente General de
SADEM-OSDEM, Sindicato Argentino de Musicos, Buenos
Aires, Argentina
Dixon, Lionel President, World Association of Public Employment Services,
Canada
Edwards, Alejandra Cox Professor of Labor Economics, University of California at
Long Beach, Long Beach, California
Ferraiuolo, Roberto Diretor Titular do Dpto. De Relaçoes Intersindicais e do
Trabalho, Federçao das Indústrias do Estado de Sao Paulo
(FIESP), Sao Paulo, BrazilFigueroa, Armando Caro Ex-Ministro, Ministero de Trabajo, Director, Human Capital,
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Funes de Rioja, Daniel  Presidente, Departamento de Política Social, Unión Industrial
Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Gill, Indermit Labor Economist, World Bank, Brasilia Office, Brasilia, Brazil
Goldin, Adrian O. Abogado laboral, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Henry, Cecil Senior Executive Officer, Acting Assistant Director for Short-
Term Benefits, National Insurance Office, Barbados
Jackman, Richard Labor Economist, London School of Economics
Licorish, St. Elmo Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Community
Development & Sports, Barbados
Ludwig, Larry U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC
Marsiglia, Francisco Secretario Adjunto, Governo do Estado de Sao Paulo,
Secretaria do Emprego e Relaçoes do Trabalho, Sao Paolo,
Brazil
MacLean, Wendy Office Director, National Employment Bureau, Barbados
Montenegro, Fernando Chefe para Assuntos Técnicos Administrativos de Relaçoes
Intersindicais e do Trabalho, Federçao das Indústrias do Estado
de Sao Paulo (FIESP), Sao Paulo, Brazil
Morris, Robert Deputy General Secretary, Barbados Workers Union, Barbados
Nelson, Joan Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC
Templeman, Sheryl Interstate Conference for Employment Security Agencies,
Washington, DC
Tomassoni, Alberto Asesor, Sindicato de Empleados de Comercio, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Torelly, Rodolfo Péres Coordenador, Ministério do Trabalho, Secretaria de Políticas
de Emprego e Salario, Coorneaçao-geral do Seguro-
Desemprego e Abono Salarial, Brasília-D.F., Brazil
Paes de Barros,  Professor, IPEA, Rio de Janiero, Brazil
RicardoPastore, José Consultant, Confederaço Nacional da Indústria e professor,
Univ. do Sao Paulo, Brasília-D.F., Brazil
Pitz, Carl German Embassy, Washington, DC
Prado, Dr. Antonio  Member, Technical Board of Directors, Departamento
Intersindical de Estatística e Estudios Sócio-Economicos,
(DIESSE), Sao Paulo, Brazil
Takasaki, Shinichi First Secretary, Economic Section, Japanese Embassy,
Washington, DC
Trotman, LeRoy Senator, Barbados Workers Union, Barbados
Urani, Andrés Secretary of Labor, State of Rio de Janiero, Brazil
White, Averille Senior Research Officer, National Insurance Office, Barbados
Wills, Joan            Center for Educational Leadership, Washington, D.CANNEX III
Bibliography
Advisory Council on Unemployment. February, 1994. Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation: Report and Recommendations.  Washington, DC: Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation.
Azeredo, Beatriz. Políticas Públicas de Emprego no Brasil: A Experiência Recente. 1997.
Dissertation presented to the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
Azeredo, Beatriz and José Paulo Chadad. December, 1992. O Programa Brasileiro de
Seguro-Desemprego: Diagnostico e Proposiçoes de Aperfeiçoamento. Rio de Janeiro: Centro
de Estudos de Políticas Públicas.
Barbados National Insurance Board. February, 1998. Ninth Actuarial Report of the Operation
of the Barbados National Insurance Scheme as at 31 December 1996. Bridgetown: Barbados
National Insurance Board.
Blaustein, Saul J., Wilbur J. Cohen and William Haber. 1993. Unemployment Insurance in
the United States: the First Half Century. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Bundesandstalt für Arbeit. 1993. The Bundesandstalt für Arbfeit Introduces Itself.
Nuremberg: Bundesandstalt für Arbeit, Public Relations Section, Federal Republic of
Germany.
Central Bank of Barbados. April, 1998. Economic and Financial Statistics. Bridgetown:
Central Bank of Barbados.
de Crombrugghe, Alain.  June, 1997. Wage and Pension Pressure on the Polish Budget.
Washington, DC: World Bank, Working Paper Series.
A Dialogue: Unemployment Insurance and Employment Service Programs. 1998.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
Duryea, Suzanne and Miguel Székely. May 14, 1998. "Labor Markets in Latin America: A
Supply-Side Story"  in Employment in Latin America: What is the Problem and How to
Address It? Washington, DC: Proceedings of seminar at the Inter-American Development
Bank.
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. November, 1994. "Social Security at the
Glance." Bonn: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.Góra, Marek. 1995. "Employment Policies and Programmes in Poland." In M. Godfrey and
P. Richards, editors.  Employment Policies and Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Geneva: International Labour Office.
Inter-American Development Bank. 1996. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America.
Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
---. Labor Markets and Competitiveness in Barbados. October, 1997. Washington, DC: Inter-
American Development Bank, Economic and Sector Study Series, RE3-97-003.
Jackman, Richard and Catalin Pauna. 1997. "Labour Market Policy and the Reallocation of
Labor Across Sectors”. In S. Zecchini, editor. Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central
And Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lehmann, Harmut. August, 1995. Active Labour Market Policies in the OECD and in
Selected Transition Economies. Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper.
----.  July, 1993. Labour Market Flows and the Evaluation of Labour Market Policies in
Poland. London: Center for Economic Performance, London School of Economics,
Discussion Paper No. 161.
Lora, Eduardo and Gustavo Márquez. May 14, 1998. "The Employment Problems in Latin
America: Perceptions and Stylized Facts?” in Employment in Latin America: What is the
Problem and How to Address It? Washington, DC: Proceedings of seminar at the Inter-
American Development Bank.
Márquez, Gustavo. February, 1999. "Unemployment Insurance and Emergency Employment
Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Overview."  Washington, DC: Office of
the Chief Economist, Inter-American Development Bank.
Martin, John.  1996. "Measures of Replacement Rates for the Purpose of International
Comparisons: A Note." OECD Economic Studies. I (26).
Ministério do Trabalho. March, 1998. Sumário Executivo, Programs de Geração de Emprego
e Renda, Seguro-Desemprego, Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador.  Brasilia: Ministério do
Trabalho.
New Insight: Magazine of the National Insurance Office. January-April 1993. Bridgetown:
Barbados National Insurance Board.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1994. The Public Employment
Service in Japan, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. Paris: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.---. 1996.  Lessons from  Labour Market Policies in the Transition Countries. Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
---.   1993. Unemployment Insurance and Active Labour Market Policies (Paris: Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Pastore, José.  1997. Encargos Sociais: Implicações para o Salário, Emprego e
Competitividade. Sao Paulo: Editora LTr.
Ruppert, Elizabeth.  September, 1996. Unemployment Insurance in Algeria: Implications for
a Labor Market in Transition.  Washington, DC: World Bank, Working Paper Series.
Smith, Grantley and Averille White. 1991. "The Experience in the Establishment and
Administration of Unemployment Insurance and Severance Payment Schemes in Barbados."
Bridgetown: The National Insurance Office.
Takanashi, Akira, et al. 1997. Employment Insurance Law. Japanese Economy and Labour
Series, no. 3. Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour.
Tzannatos, Zafiris and Suzanne Roddis. May 5, 1998. Unemployment Benefits: Draft 1.
Washington, DC: The World Bank, Social Protection Unit.
U.S. Department of Labor. 1998a. Technical Supplement: Additional Information on the UI
Program. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
---. 1998b. Technical Supplement: Benefit Funding. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Labor.
---. 1998c. Technical Supplement: Current Environment. Washington: U.S. Department of
Labor.
---. 1998d. Technical Supplement: UI Program Mission and Principles. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Labor.
United Nations. 1997. World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision. New York: United
Nations.
World Bank. 1992. Estimating the Benefits of Labor Reform in Argentina.  Washington DC:
World Bank, Annexes.
---. 1993. Poland: Income Support and the Social Safety Net During the Transition.
Washington, DC: World Bank.